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human rights. The Business and Human Rights arbitration (BHR arbitration) proposal seeks to give local
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access to justice in a specialized international BHR arbitration tribunal. Through a comparison between
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reform ISA than to create a BHR arbitration tribunal. Reforming ISA would avoid the possible parallel
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reduce local communities’ need to resort to transnational litigation, which is procedurally complex and
often unsuccessful. Therefore, the possibility of ISA reform makes the BHR arbitration proposal
superfluous or, at best, limited in its potential application. Creating a new arbitral structure that is
untested and fraught with procedural and substantive complexities may not be worth the trouble.
Considering the parallels between the ISA and proposed BHR arbitration, and the prospect of creating a
one-stop shop for business and human rights abuse, this article suggests that BHR arbitration is an
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arbitration, this article contends that it would be more efficient to reform ISA than to create a
BHR arbitration tribunal. Reforming ISA would avoid the possible parallel arbitration systems
that may arise from the duplication of international governance efforts. It would also reduce
local communities’ need to resort to transnational litigation, which is procedurally complex
and often unsuccessful. Therefore, the possibility of ISA reform makes the BHR arbitration
proposal superfluous or, at best, limited in its potential application. Creating a new arbitral
structure that is untested and fraught with procedural and substantive complexities may
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international arbitration and a distraction from necessary ISA reform.
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GLOBALIZATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY has transformed the world’s
economic, social, and political structures in diverse and indelible ways.1 Te
continued need for national economic growth has melted national borders, which
ultimately encourages interactions between states and multinational corporations
(MNCs) as global actors.2 MNCs in particular have evolved as one of the most
important infuencers of economic growth through foreign direct investments
(FDI).3 In contrast, states have “shrunk in importance and infuence” in shaping

1.

2.

3.

Globalization in this context refers to “a process (or set of processes) which embodies a
transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions, generating
transcontinental or interregional fows and networks of activity, interaction and power.”
See David Held et al, “Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture” in Chris
Pierson & Simon Tormey, eds, Politics at the Edge: Te PSA Yearbook 1999 (Macmillan Press,
2000) 14 at 15.
Tere is no legally acceptable defnition of multinational corporations (MNCs). In this
article, I descriptively refer to MNCs as corporate entities that engage in direct investment
outside their home countries. See Peter Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the
Law, 2nd ed (Oxford University press, 2007) at 12-15. See also B Kogut, “Multinational
Corporations” in Neil Smelser & Paul Baltes, eds, International Encyclopedia of the Social &
Behavioural Sciences (Oxford University Press, 2001) 10197.
See Jörn Kleinert, “Te Role of Multinational Enterprises in Globalization: An Empirical
Overview” (2001) Kiel Working Papers No 1069 at 1; Jefery A Hart, “Globalization and
Multinational Corporations” in Phil Harris & Craig Fleisher, eds, Te SAGE Handbook of
International Corporate and Public Afairs (SAGE Publications, 2017) at 323 (MNCs are
both benefciaries and agents of globalization); AO Osibanjo, AE Oyewunmi, & OP Salau,
“Globalization and Multinational Corporations: Te Nigerian Business Environment in
Perspective” (2014) 16:11 ISOR-JBM (3rd) 1 at 3.
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matters relating to global economic activities and investment.4 Te enormous rise
in infuence of MNCs in FDI has eroded states’ power and sovereignty, especially
as it relates to states’ policy space.5
International law’s governance framework of International Investment
Agreements (IIAs), which includes Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and the
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), regulates investors’ and host states’
FDI activities in a global market.6 Trough its principles and dispute settlement
mechanism, international investment law seeks to encourage FDI, protect
foreign investments, and settle investment disputes between foreign investors
and host states.

4.
5.

6.

Constantine E Passaris, “Te Business of Globalization and the Globalization of Business”
(2006) 9 J Comp Intl Mgmt 3 at 3. See also Saskia Sassen, “Embedding the Global in the
National: Implications for the Role of the State” (1999) 7 Macalester Intl 31.
See Paul A Haslam, “Te Firm Rules: Multinational Corporations, Policy Space and
Neoliberalism” (2007) 28 Tird World Q 1167; Steve Kapfer, “Multinational Corporations
and the Erosion of State Sovereignty” (Paper prepared for the Illinois State University
Conference, 7 April 2006), [unpublished], online: <https://pol.illinoisstate.edu/downloads/
conferences/2006/Kapfer2006.pdf> [https://perma.cc/G7BC-B3Y7].
Foreign direct investment is defned as “investment by a person or entity domiciled in one
country (‘the investor’), in a business domiciled in another country (‘the investment’),
in which the former has signifcant infuence on the management of the latter.” See Daniel
Schwanen, “Foreign Direct Investment in Canada - Te Case for Further Openness and
Transparency” (CD Howe Institute, 26 July 2018), online: <https://www.cdhowe.org/sites/
default/fles/attachments/research_papers/mixed/FDI%20-%20Te%20Case%20for%20
Further%20Openness%20and%20Transparency.pdf> [https://perma.cc/WHN5-3A7Q].
Te International Momentary Fund and Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development defne direct “foreign investment” as “cross-border investment made by a
resident entity in one economy (the ‘direct investor’ or ‘multinational enterprise’) with the
objective of establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in an economy other
than that of the direct investor (the ‘foreign afliate’).” See OECD, Detailed Benchmark
Defnition of Foreign Direct Investment, 3rd ed (OECD, 1996). See generally, Samuel
KB Asante, “International Law and Foreign Investment: A Reappraisal” (1988) 37
Intl & Comp LQ 588.
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Tis article focuses on investor-state arbitration (ISA) under the International
Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention.7 Although there
are other means of dispute resolution in the ISDS regime, including conciliation,
mediation and a fact-fnding process, this article is limited to discussions of
ISA, and it uses the term ISDS and ISA interchangeably to represent dispute
settlement under the ICSID Convention.8 In particular, it examines issues of
access to justice in ISA, especially as it relates to local communities’ inability to
directly participate in ISA proceedings. It has been noted that “[f ]urther studies
are needed to explore how those who ultimately bear the costs of investment
rules—developing country states and host communities—could be included in
the process of redefning international investment governance and shaping the
content of investment protection policies.”9

7.

8.

9.

Te ICSID is an autonomous intergovernmental organization established under the
Convention on the Settlement of Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States
(ICSID Convention). Te primary purpose of ICSID is to provide facilities for conciliation
and arbitration of international investment disputes. Te ICSID Convention is a multilateral
treaty formulated by the Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (the World Bank). It was opened for signature on March 18, 1965,
and entered into force on October 14, 1966. See Aron Broches, “Te Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States” (1972) 136
Rec des Cours 331. Although there are other dispute settlement mechanisms in multilateral
trade agreements like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Trans-Pacifc
Partnership (TPP), the Canada-EU Trade Agreement (CETA), and the Trans-Atlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), ICSID accounts for 62 percent of publicly
known investor arbitration. Terefore, the investor-state dispute settlement under ICSID
presents robust case studies and literature for analysis. See also Jonathan Bonnitcha, Lauge N
Skovgaard Poulsen & Michael Waibel, Te Political Economy of the Investment Treaty Regime
(Oxford University Press, 2017) at 69.
Indeed, Laryea notes that “the term ISDS has become synonymous with investor–state
arbitration (“ISA”).” Emmanuel T Laryea “MAKING INVESTMENT ARBITRATION
WORK FOR ALL: ADDRESSING THE DEFICITS IN ACCESS TO REMEDY FOR
WRONGED HOST STATE CITIZENS THROUGH INVESTMENT ARBITRATION”
(2018) 59 Boston College L Rev 2845 at 2846.
Mavluda Sattorova, “Do Developing Countries Really Beneft from Investment Treaties?
Te Impact of International Investment Law on National Governance,” (21 December
2018), online: International Institute for Sustainable Development <https://www.iisd.org/
itn/2018/12/21/do-developing-countries-really-beneft-from-investment-treaties-the-impactof-international-investment-law-on-national-governance-mavluda-sattorova/> [https://
perma.cc/S87E-RWH7].
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Tis article does not answer the question of “how” local communities
can participate in ISA proceedings.10 Rather it asks the preliminary question
of whether local communities can (or should) directly participate in ISA
proceedings in the frst place. It answers this question positively and goes on to
argue that, rather than creating a new arbitration forum where local communities
can fle claims, the ISDS could be reformed to include local communities’ direct
participation in matters that concern them. It contends that if the ISDS were to
be reformed in this manner, it would prevent the fragmentation of international
dispute resolution mechanisms that could result in parallel proceedings between
two or more arbitration tribunals.
Te recent ICSID and United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL) ISDS reform eforts are refections of the challenges that limit
local communities’ access to justice.11 Te ICSID and UNCITRAL secretariats’
working papers on ISDS reform include issues relating to the appointment
of arbitrators, cost of arbitration, and confdentiality in ISA proceedings.12
Also, governments, non-government institutions, and scholars have submitted
proposals on the joinder of afected third parties (local communities) in ISA

10. Te defnition of “local community” is highly problematic because it involves political and
nationality considerations. See generally Lisa Tompson, Chris Tapscott & Pamela Tsolekile
De Wet, “An Exploration of the Concept of Community and its Impact on Participatory
Governance Policy and Service Delivery in Poor Areas of Cape Town, South Africa” (2018)
45 SAJ Pol Stud 276. However, the term “local community” as used in this article generally
refers to a group of people who constitute a community at local levels or grass-root levels of
government, especially in developing countries. See e.g. David Szablowski, Transnational Law
and Local Struggles: Mining, Communities and the World Bank (Hart, 2007).
11. See “Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Reform Rules” (15 March 2019), Working
Paper No 2, online: ICSID <https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/fles/amendments/
Vol_1.pdf > [https://perma.cc/ZL3X-V4L6].
12. Ibid. See also Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law,
UN GAOR 72nd Sess, Supp No 17, UN Doc A/72/17 (2017); Report of the Working Group
III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) on the Work of its 35th Session (14 May 2018),
UNCITRAL 51st Sess, UN Doc A/CN.9/935.
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proceedings to the UNCITRAL Working Group III.13 Similarly, Odumosu,14
Laryea,15 and Perrone16 have in their scholarly contributions argued for local
communities’ participation in ISA proceedings. Although Odumosu believes that
participation does not necessarily mean a formal (direct) participatory status in
ISA proceedings,17 Laryea and Perrone advocate for a direct participatory status in
ISA proceedings.18 Also, Gus Van Harten, Jane Kelsey, and David Schneiderman
argue that the exclusion of afected third party participation in ISA proceedings
is a “striking procedural faw.”19
Tis article contributes to the call for local community participation in ISA
proceedings. It argues that this reform is more compelling because of the recent
proposal to adapt international arbitration to business disputes involving human
13. “Summary Comments to the Proposals for Amendments of the ICSID Arbitration Rules”
(2019), online: International Institute for Sustainable Development <https://www.iisd.
org/system/fles/publications/comments-proposals-amendment-icsid-arbitration-rules.pdf>
[https://perma.cc/5W7V-E39F].
14. Ibironke T Odumosu, “Locating Tird World Resistance in the International Law on
Foreign Investment” (2007) 9 Intl Community L Rev 427 [Odumosu, “Locating Tird
World Resistance”]; Ibironke T Odumosu-Ayanu, “Governments, Investors and Local
Communities: Analysis of a Multi-Actor Investment Contract Framework” (2014) 15
Melb J Intl L 473; Ibironke T Odumosu, “Te Law and Politics of Engaging Resistance
in Investment Dispute Settlement” (2007) 26 Penn St Intl L Rev 251; Ibironke T
Odumosu, ICSID, Tird World Peoples and the Re-Construction of the Investment Dispute
Settlement System (PhD Dissertation, University of British Columbia, 2010) [unpublished],
[Odumosu, “ICSID”].
15. Laryea, supra note 8.
16. Nicolás Perrone, “Te International Investment Regime and Local Communities: Are the
Weakest Voices Unheard?” (2016) 7 Transnat’l Leg Teory 383 at 384 [Perrone, “Weakest
Voices”]; Nicolás Perrone, “Te ‘Invisible’ Local Communities: Foreign Investor Obligations,
Inclusiveness, and the International Investment Regime” (2019) 112 AJIL 16 [Perrone,
“Invisible Local Communities”].
17. Odumosu, ICSID, supra note 14 at 309. Odumosu notes:
Participation in this sense does not need to involve formal participation or legal participatory
status in the manner that such status applies to states and investors. It is sufcient that a
tribunal may be willing or unwilling to consider the activities of actors that a party to a dispute
settlement proceeding pleads, because of the actors’ identity. Tribunals’ constructions of these
activities have signifcant impacts not only on activist groups, but also on the state parties or
foreign investors that plead the incidences of resistance.

See also Odumosu, “Locating Tird World Resistance” supra note 14 at 444.
18. Laryea, supra note 8. See generally Perrone, “Weakest Voices”; Perrone, “Invisible Local
Communities,” supra note 16.
19. See generally Gus Van Harten, Jane Kelsey & David Schneiderman, “Phase 2 of the
UNCITRAL ISDS Review: Why ‘Other Matters Really Matter,’” (2019) [unpublished,
archived in the Osgoode Hall Law School Digital Commons].
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rights, the Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration (“Hague
Rules”).20 Te Hague Rules seek to give local communities that are victims of
MNCs’ human rights and environmental abuse access to justice in a specialized
international arbitration tribunal—the Business and Human Rights Arbitration
Tribunal.21 Trough a comparison of ISA and Business and Human Rights
arbitration (BHR arbitration), this article contends that it is more efcient to
reform ISDS in relation to local community participation than to create a BHR
arbitration tribunal. Tis approach prevents possible parallel arbitration systems
that may arise from the duplication of international governance eforts. It also
reduces local communities’ resort to transnational litigation, which is procedurally
complex and often unsuccessful.22 In efect, ISDS reform makes the BHR
arbitration proposal superfuous or, at best, limited in its potential application.23
“Access to justice” in this article refers to the “ability of people, particularly
from poor and disadvantaged groups, to seek and obtain a remedy through
formal and informal justice systems, in accordance with human rights principles
and standards.”24 Tis article takes a narrow procedural approach that focuses
on access—that is, the means by which rights are made efective—rather than a

20. See Claes Cronstedt, Jan Eijsbouts & Robert Tompson, “International Business
and Human Rights Arbitration” (13 February 2017) Working Group Paper on
Business and Human Rights Arbitration 23, online: Center for International
Legal Cooperation <https://www.cilc.nl/cms/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/
INTERNATIONAL-ARBITRATION-TO-RESOLVE-HUMAN-RIGHTS-DISPUTESINVOLVING-BUSINESS-PROPOSAL-MAY-2017.pdf> [https://perma.cc/4KDV-KXYT].
21. See Te Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration 2019, online: Center for
International Legal Cooperation <https://www.cilc.nl/cms/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/
Te-Hague-Rules-on-Business-and-Human-Rights-Arbitration_CILC-digital-version.pdf>
[https://perma.cc/PGN5-JDYC] [Hague Rules].
22. See Peer Zumbansen, “Beyond Territoriality: Te Case of Transnational Human Rights
Litigation” (2005) [unpublished, archived in the Osgoode Hall Law School Digital
Commons]. See also Axel Marx et al, “Access to Legal Remedies for Victims of Corporate
Human Rights Abuses in Tird Countries” (2019), online: European Parliament, Policy
Department for External Relations <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/
STUD/2019/603475/EXPO_STU(2019)603475_EN.pdf> [https://perma.cc/XKS6-KLZS].
23. Tis article proceeds with the argument that most business and human rights disputes are
interwoven with investment issues. If ISDS is reformed in relation to local community
participation, BHR arbitration will be limited to only cases where there is no existing BIT
and where the issues are purely commercial.
24. United Nations Development Programme, “Programming for Justice: Access for All:
A Practitioner’s Guide to a Human Rights-Based Approach to Access to Justice” (2005) at
5, online: <https://www.un.org/ruleofaw/fles/Justice_Guides_ProgrammingForJusticeAccessForAll.pdf> [https://perma.cc/4PHZ-MB2A].

714

(2022) 59 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

wider approach that focuses on judicial outcomes.25 It examines access to justice
for local communities as rights holders in investment law and their opportunity
to meaningfully participate in legal proceedings that directly afect their
socio-economic well-being. To be clear, this article does not seek to construct
a new alternative ISDS structure that includes local communities because other
commentators like Emmanuel Laryea, Nicholas Perrone, and Ibironke Odumosu
have done so.26 Rather, it seeks to provoke thoughts on the proposal made by these
commentators in light of the adoption of the new Hague Rules in 2019. I draw
on these commentators’ proposals in this article to strengthen the argument that
it is time to seriously consider an ISDS reform to include local communities
instead of creating a new arbitral regime.
Generally, ISDS, as a dispute resolution mechanism, has been the subject of
scholarly debates.27 Some scholars attack the ISDS regime on a variety of grounds
including the impropriety of delegating adjudicatory powers to private individuals
on disputes relating to host states’ policy decisions,28 the marginal role of human

25. See generally Nahakul Subedi, “A Normative Dilemma on Access to Justice: Much Emphasis
on ACCESS and Little on JUSTICE - Need to Revisit the Socio-Legal Interface” (2012) 6
NJA LJ 50; Garth Bryant & Mauro Cappelletti, “Access to Justice: Te Newest Wave in the
Worldwide Movement to Make Rights Efective” (1978) 27 Buf L Rev 181.
26. Laryea, supra note 8; Odumosu, ICSID, supra note 14 at 309; Odumosu, “Locating Tird
World Resistance” supra note 14 at 444. See generally Perrone, “Weakest Voices”; Perrone,
“Invisible Local Communities,” supra note 16.
27. See e.g. Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, “A Coming Crisis: Expansionary Trends in
Investment Treaty Arbitration” in Karl P Sauvant with Michael Chiswick-Patterson, eds,
Appeals Mechanism in International Investment Disputes (Oxford University Press, 2008) 39;
Leon E Trakman, “Te ICSID Under Siege” (2012) 45 Cornell Intl LJ 603; Cecilia Olivet,
Natacha Cingotti, Pia Eberhardt, Winning the Debate against Pro-ISDS Voices: An Activist’s
Argument Guide (Transnational Institute, Friends of the Earth International and Corporate
Europe Observatory, 2017); J Anthony VanDuzer, “Enhancing the Procedural Legitimacy of
Investor-State Arbitration Trough Transparency and Amicus Curiae Participation” (2007)
52 McGill LJ 681.
28. See Ayelet Banai, “Is Investor-State Arbitration Unfair? A Freedom-Based Perspective”
(2017) 10 Global Justice: Teory, Practice, Rhetoric 57; Lisa Diependaele, Ferdi De Ville
& Sigrid Sterckx, “Assessing the Normative Legitimacy of Investment Arbitration: Te EU’s
Investment Court System” (2019) 24 New Political Economy 37; “230 Law and Economics
Professors Urge President Trump to Remove Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) From
NAFTA and Other Pacts,” online: Public Citizen <https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/
uploads/migration/case_documents/isds-law-economics-professors-letter-oct-2017_2.pdf>
[https://perma.cc/4LHL-C37W].
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rights and environmental protection considerations in investment disputes,29 ISA
tribunal’s bias towards investors,30 inconsistent arbitral decisions,31 the lack of an
appeal system,32 and non-transparent proceedings.33 Tey conclude that these
problems culminate in a legitimacy crisis in ISA.34 Other scholars defend the
ISDS regime on the basis that ISDS protects foreign investors and encourages the
fow of foreign investment.35 In their view, criticisms of ISDS are overstatements
and exaggerations that are unsupported by hard evidence.36 Tis article does not
29. See Mehmet Toral & Tomas Schultz, “Te State, a Perpetual Respondent in Investment
Arbitration? Some Unorthodox Considerations” in Michael Waibel et al, eds, Te Backlash
Against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality (Kluwer Law International, 2010) at
577; Bruno Simma, “Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human Rights?” (2011) 60
Te Intl & Comparative LQ 573.
30. See Olivia Chung, “Te Lopsided International Investment Law Regime and Its Efect on
the Future of Investor-State Arbitration” (2007) 47 Va J Intl L 953 at 956-57; Julien Fouret,
“Te World Bank and ICSID: Family or Incestuous Ties?” (2007) 4 Intl Org L Rev 121;
Sergio Puig & Anton Strezhnev, “Te David Efect and ISDS” (2017) 28 Eur J Intl L 731.
31. See Susan D Franck, “Te Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing
Public International Law through Inconsistent Decisions” (2005) 73 Fordham L Rev 1521.
32. See Michael Wilson, “Te Enron v. Argentina Annulment Decision: Moving a Bishop
Vertically in the Precarious ICSID System” (2012) 43 U Miami Inter-Am L Rev 347 at
372-73; Sachet Singh & Sooraj Sharma, “Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Te
Quest for a Workable Roadmap” (2013) 29 Utrecht J Intl& European L 88.
33. See Barnali Choudhury, “Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s Engagement
of the Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Defcit?” (2008) 41 Vand J Transnat’l
L 775 at 808-810; Alessandra Asteriti & Christian Tams, “Transparency and Representation
of the Public Interest in Investment Treaty Arbitration” in Stephan W Schill, ed, International
Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2010) 787.
34. See e.g. Julius Cosmas, “Legitimacy Crisis in Investor–State International Arbitration System:
A Critique on the Suggested Solutions & the Proposal on the Way Forward” (2014) 4 Intl
J Scientifc & Research Publications 1; David Schneiderman, “Legitimacy and Refexivity
in International Investment Arbitration: A New Self-Restraint?” (2011) 2 J Intl Dispute
Settlement 471; Susan Franck, supra note 31.
35. See e.g. Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment
Law (Oxford University Press, 2008) at 214-15. See also Armand de Mestral,
INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION BETWEEN DEVELOPED DEMOCRATIC
COUNTRIES (Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2015) at 7-23.
36. See Charles N Brower & Sadie Blanchard, “What’s in a Meme? Te Truth about
Investor-State Arbitration: Why It Need Not, and Must Not, Be Repossessed by States”
(2014) 52 Colum J Transnat’l L 689; Charles N Brower, Charles H Brower II & Jeremy K
Sharpe, “Te Coming Crisis in the Global Adjudication System” (2003) 19 Arb Intl 415;
Charles N Brower & Stephan W Schill, “Is Arbitration a Treat or a Boon to the Legitimacy
of International Investment Law?” (2009) 9 Chi J Intl L 471; Sergio Puig, “EMERGENCE
& DYNAMISM IN INTERNATIONAL ORGAIZATIONS: ICSID, INVESTOR-STATE
ARBITRATION & INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW” (2013) 44 Geo J Intl
L 531; Daphna Kapeliuk, “THE REPEAT APPOINTMENT FACTOR: EXPLORING
DECISION PATTERNS OF ELITE INVESTMENT ARBITRATORS” (2010) 96 Cornell
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engage in these debates because they are well rehearsed in the literature. Rather,
it asks whether the BHR arbitration proposal is a testament to the irredeemable
failure of the ISDS regime, especially as it relates to human rights and local
community participation in ISA proceedings.
Some scholars propose abolishing ISDS and replacing it with an independent
world investment court (WIC),37 an international court system,38 state-state
dispute settlement,39 or domestic courts.40 Indeed, one commentator states: “I
think it is better to recognize that the system was poorly designed and has been
malfunctioning for three decades, and that dismantling it and starting from scratch
is the wiser course.”41 I do not advocate any of these possible options because the
solution to ISDS legitimacy crises does not lie in throwing away the baby with
the bathwater.42 Rather, it lies in institutional and systemic reform, which entails
redefning stakeholders’ entrenched interests in the international investment law

37.

38.
39.

40.

41.
42.

L Rev 47; “A response to the criticism against ISDS” (17 May 2015), online (pdf ): European
Federation for Investment Law and Arbitration <efla.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/
EFILA_in_response_to_the-criticism_of_ISDS_fnal_draft.pdf> [perma.cc/4XJJ-LZW4].
See David M Howard, “CREATING CONSISTENCY THROUGH A WORLD
INVESTMENT COURT” (2017) 41 Fordham Intl LJ 1; Nicolette Butler & Surya
Subedi, “Te Future of International Investment Regulation: Towards a World Investment
Organisation?” (2017) 64 Netherlands Intl L Rev 43.
See UNCITRAL, Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform)
Secretariat, Possible reform of investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS), 36th Sess, UN DOC A/
CN.9/WG.III/WP.149, 5 September 2018 at 10.
See Denis Côté, “Whose rights are we protecting? Ensuring the primacy of human rights
over investors protections in the international legal regime” (March 2016) at 23, online
(pdf ): Cooperation Canada <cooperation.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/2016_03_Whose_
rights_are_we_protecting.pdf> [perma.cc/W3UX-VPR4].
See Roderick Abbott, Fredrik Erixon & Martina Francesca Ferracane, “Demystifying
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)” (2014) ECIPE Occasional Paper (5th) at 17. Tis
proposal is criticized for creating an imbalanced or selective treatment between developed
and developing countries. See Hugo Perezcano, “RISKS OF A SELECTIVE APPROACH
TO INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION” (13 April 2016) online (pdf ): Centre for
International Governance Innovation <www.cigionline.org/static/documents/isa_paper_
no.3.pdf> [perma.cc/K8TJ-7YTX]; Armand de Mestral, ed, Second Toughts: Investor-State
Arbitration between Developed Democracies (CIGI Press, 2017).
George Kahale III, “Te Inaugural Brooklyn Lecture on International Business Law: ISDS:
Te Wild, Wild West of International Practice” (2018) 44 Brook J Intl L 1 at 10.
It has been noted that “investor-state arbitration may change, and is changing, but is unlikely
to disappear anytime soon.” See Taylor St John, Te Rise of Investor-State Arbitration: Politics,
Law, and Unintended Consequences (Oxford University Press, 2018) at 250.
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regime.43 Tis reform involves recalibrating the political and economic interests
of states and MNCs as global actors. In efect, the realization of an inclusive
ISDS depends on investment actors’ resolve to build a participatory regime
where investors, host states, and local communities settle investment disputes in
a single forum.
Tis article proceeds in seven sections. Part I briefy notes the history, nature,
and justifcation for establishing ISA and distinguishes it from international
commercial arbitration. While international commercial arbitration recognizes
reciprocal rights between parties, ISA downplays investors’ obligations to host
states and local communities, especially in relation to human rights and the
environment. Part II argues that the marginal role of investors’ obligations in
ISA contributes to the lack of (or limited) local community representation in
ISA proceedings. It notes that notwithstanding the role of local communities
in international investment discourse, they have limited access to justice in ISA
proceedings. Part III explores the BHR arbitration proposal, which seeks to give
local communities direct access to justice in a specialized arbitration tribunal.
It compares ISA with BHR arbitration to draw a parallel between both systems.
Part IV argues that while it is important in some ways to develop specialized
regimes like BHR arbitration, the BHR arbitration proposal is an unnecessary
efort to secure access to justice for local communities. Te prospect of creating
parallel arbitral systems and peculiar procedural challenges make the BHR
arbitration proposal problematic. Tis section argues that a reformed ISDS
regime would achieve result identical to BHR arbitration. It therefore advocates
for an inclusive ISDS reform that resolves investment disputes in a one-stop shop
manner. Part V considers possible objections to the proposed reform. It classifes
them as procedural and politico-economic challenges. Although these objections
are legitimate, it argues that international investment law must rise beyond them
to facilitate access to justice for all. Part VI concludes with a refection: Although
BHR arbitration is problematic, an ISDS reform is also a difcult task. Te
preference for an ISDS reform should therefore be motivated by the principle of
choosing the lesser of two evils.

43. Stakeholders include MNCs, states, international organizations, local communities, and
non-governmental organizations. I use the term “regime” in the same way that Steven
Ratner defnes it: “A self-identifed feld of international law comprising norms to regulate
a certain type of conduct and institutions to make decisions within it.” See Steven Ratner,
“REGULATORY TAKINGS IN INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT: BEYOND THE FEAR
OF FRAGMENTED INTERNATIONAL LAW” (2008) 102 AJIL 475 at 485.
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I. THE NATURE OF INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION
Before the creation of ISDS, domestic courts were the only avenue that investors
could use to complain about states’ behaviours, and any complaint had to be based
on the domestic law of the state whose conduct was being impugned.44 If foreign
investors were unsatisfed with domestic court decisions and had exhausted all
local remedies, they would resort to customary international law principles to
seek diplomatic protection from their home countries.45 Tis is because, under
customary international law, individuals or corporations cannot challenge states’
administrative or policy actions.46 Terefore, in cases where host states’ measures
are inadequate or not forthcoming in investment disputes, home governments
exercise diplomatic rights to protect their nationals’ investments.47
Due to reservations about domestic courts’ independence and the political
issues involved in seeking diplomatic protection, ISDS was established as an
independent international forum to assuage investors’ concerns regarding
disputes arising from investment treaties.48 Although there were earlier
non-treaty investor-state arbitrations, like the ARAMCO Arbitration, the Qatar
Arbitration, and the Abu Dhabi Arbitration, ISDS was established through a
treaty in 1966—the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of other States (“ICSID Convention”).49 Te International
Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) provides a procedural
arbitral framework for dispute settlement between host states and foreign
investors. In contrast to diplomatic relations under customary international law,
ISDS “[ofers] to investors assurances that disputes that might fow from their
investments would not be subject to the perceived hazards of delays and political

44. See Eric De Brabandere, Investment Treaty Arbitration as Public International Law (Cambridge
University Press, 2014) at 20.
45. Ibid. It has been noted that “it is an elementary principle of international law that a State is
entitled to protect its subjects, when injured by acts contrary to international law committed
by another State, from whom they have been unable to obtain satisfaction through the
ordinary channels.” Sachet Singh & Sooraj Sharma, supra note 32 at 90, citing Mavrommatis
Palestine Concessions (Greece v UK) (1924), PCIJ (Ser B) No 3 at para 21 [Mavrommatis].
46. See Mavrommatis, supra note 45.
47. See Jeswald W Salacus, “Te Emerging Global Regime for Investment” (2010) 51 Harv
Intl LJ 427 at 463.
48. See Nigel Blackaby, “Public Interest and Investment Treaty Arbitration” (2004) 1 TDM 355;
Alan O Sykes, “Public versus Private Enforcement of International Economic Law: Standing
and Remedy” (2005) 34 J Legal Stud 631 at 643.
49. 18 March 1965, 575 UNTS 159 (entered into force 14 October 1966) [ICSID Convention].
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pressures of adjudication in national courts.”50 In efect, ISDS is posited to be a
neutral dispute resolution mechanism created to depoliticize investment disputes
between states.51
Tis protection was necessary because of the political and economic climate
at the time the ICSID Convention was signed. Te ICSID Convention came
into force during a decolonizing period when newly independent developing
states, who are primarily capital importing countries, were moving to eliminate
the economic and political infuence of their former colonizers.52 To protect the
business interests of developed countries’ nationals in newly formed independent
states, developed countries negotiated and signed BITs with their counterparts
in the global south.53 Trough non-expropriation clauses in BITs, investors
50. Gas Natural SDG, SA v Argentine Republic (2005) at 29 (International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes) (Arbitrators: Prof Andreas F Lowenfeld, Mr Henri C Álvarez,
Dr Pedro Nikken).
51. See Ursula Kriebaum, “Evaluating Social Benefts and Costs of Investment Treaties:
Depoliticization of Investment Disputes” (2018) 33 ICSID Review 14 at 14
(“Depoliticization means the transfer of such conficts from the political arena of
diplomatic protection to a judicial forum with objective, previously agreed standards and a
pre-formulated dispute settlement process”).
52. See Won Kidane, “CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW TRENDS AND AFRICA’S DILEMMAS IN THE DRAFT PAN-AFRICAN
INVESTMENT CODE” (2018) 50 Geo Wash Intl L Rev 523 at 526 (“International
investment law [IIL] comes with a very old and lingering historical baggage that continues
to engender doctrinal confusion and outright suspicion...[IIL] is not made by Africa, it was
made for Africa as a replacement for colonial rules for the protection of capital” [emphasis
in original]).
53. See M Sornarajah, Te International Law on Foreign Investment, 3rd ed (Cambridge
University Press, 2010). At inception, de Mestral notes, “very few BITs were concluded
between developed states.” de Mestral, supra note 35 at 3. See also Andrew Newcombe &
Lluís Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment (Kluwer Law
International, 2009) at 43 (noting that “[a] characteristic of BITs during this period was
the asymmetrical economic and political relationship that existed between capital exporting
and importing states. Although the obligations on the state parties to BITs were formally
reciprocal, BITs were developed by capital exporting states to protect the economic interests
of their nationals abroad.” I use the terms “global north” (developed countries) and “global
south” (developing countries) as defned by Lemuel Odeh. See Lemuel Ekedegwa Odeh,
“A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL NORTH AND GLOBAL SOUTH
ECONOMIES” (2010) 12 J Sustainable Development in Africa 338 at 338:
While Global North countries are wealthy, technologically advanced, politically stable and
aging as their societies tend towards zero population growth the opposite is the case with Global
South countries. While Global South countries are agrarian based, dependent economically
and politically on the Global North, the Global North has continued to dominate and direct
the global south in international trade and politics.
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were assured of non-expropriation of their capital. Also, through other clauses,
investors were assured of fair and equitable treatment, as well as national and
“most favored nation” treatment in host states.54
In case of disputes as to the interpretation or protection ofered to investors
in BITs, ad hoc ISA tribunals interpret and clarify investors’ rights.55 Tus,
without exhausting local remedies, investors reserve the right to claim monetary
compensation for host state measures that adversely afect their proprietary rights
under BITs at ISA tribunals.56 Although host states can also claim or counterclaim
against investors in ISA, ISA tribunals rarely recognize these rights.57 In sum, ISA
performs the dual function of resolving investment disputes (in the narrower
context of international investment law) between investors and host states and
clarifying and interpreting aspects of international law relating to FDI.58 ISA is a
special adjudicatory structure that is uncommon in international law.59 Indeed,
it has been noted that “[the] private right to sue a government for damages and
to choose the forum in which to do so constitutes the most revolutionary aspect
of the international law relating to foreign investment in the past half-century.”60
Disputes submitted to ISA can arise from investment contracts, BITS, and
other instruments, which means that ISA tribunals derive their jurisdiction

54. Kenneth J Vandevelde, “A Brief History of International Investment Agreements” in Karl P
Sauvant & Lisa E Sachs, eds, Te Efect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral
Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows (Oxford University
Press, 2009) 4 at 5. Most treaties contain standard clauses, which explain the scope of
investment, standards of treatment for investment, the scope of expropriation, and dispute
settlement procedures. See Salacuse, supra note 47 at 432.
55. Joshua Karton, “Choice of Law and Interpretive Authority in Investor-State Arbitration”
(2017) 3 Can J Comp & Contemp L 217.
56. See Sergio Puig, “NO RIGHT WITHOUT A REMEDY: FOUNDATIONS OF
INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION” (2014) 35 U Pa J Intl L 829 at 843-46.
57. See Yaraslau Kryvoi, “Counterclaims in Investor-State Arbitration” (2012) 21 Minn J
Intl L 216; Pierre Lalive & Laura Halonen, “On the Availability of Counterclaims in
Investment Treaty Arbitration” (2011) CYIL 141. See also Brower & Blanchard, supra
note 36 at 713-15.
58. See Kendall Grant, “ICSID’s Reinforcement?: UNASUR and the Rise of a Hybrid Regime
for International Investment Arbitration” (2015) 52 Osgoode Hall LJ 1115 at 1120; Susan
L Karamanian, “Overstating the Americanization of International Arbitration: Lessons from
ICSID” (2003) 19 Ohio St J on Disp Resol 5 at 9.
59. See generally Stephen E Blythe, “Te Advantages of Investor-State Arbitration as a Dispute
Resolution Mechanism in Bilateral Investment Treaties” (2013) 47 Intl Law 273.
60. Beth A Simmons, “BARGAINING OVER BITS, ARBITRATING AWARDS: Te Regime
for Protection and Promotion of International Investment” (2014) 66 World Pol 12 at 17.
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from these documents.61 It should be noted that BITs existed before the ICSID
Convention. Te frst recorded example of a BIT was between Germany and
Pakistan in 1959, long before the ICSID Convention in 1966.62 However, “[i]n
1969, ICSID issued a set of ‘Model Clauses Relating to the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes Designed for Bilateral Investment Treaties.’”63
Te clauses included texts that states could use to show consent to the ICSID
dispute resolution system. Parties have increasingly adopted these clauses in their
resolve to settle their disputes via the ICSID system.64 While BITs contain the
substantive agreements, parties may or may not choose the dispute resolution
mechanisms under ICSID, which include arbitration, facilitated mediation and
negotiation, conciliation, early neutral evaluation, and fact-fnding process.65
Te ICSID Rules regulate procedural aspects of ICSID proceedings.
However, if one of the parties is not a signatory to the ICSID Convention, the
dispute may be regulated by “the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, or under
other rules as the consent to arbitration permits.”66 ISA relies substantially on
the procedural design of international commercial arbitration, which includes
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration
(“UNCITRAL Rules”) and the London Court of International Arbitration
Rules.67 ISA’s reliance on a commercial arbitration procedure raises the debate
of whether ISA is a private or public international law institution. While some
commentators argue that it is a public international law institution with a
public law function,68 others argue that ISA is sui generis because it combines
the private nature of commercial arbitration with the public international law

61. See Andrea K Bjorklund, “Te Emerging Civilization of Investment Arbitration” (2009) 113
Penn St L Rev 1269 at 1271.
62. See Antonio R Parra, “ICSID AND THE RISE OF BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES: WILL ICSID BE THE LEADING ARBITRATION INSTITUTION IN THE
EARLY 21st CENTURY?” (2000) 94 Soc’y Intl L Proc 41 at 41.
63. Ibid at 42.
64. See generally Antonio R Parra, Te History of ICSID, 2nd ed (Oxford University Press, 2017).
65. See “Other Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms,” online: ICSID <icsid.worldbank.
org/services-arbitration-other-adr-mechanisms> [perma.cc/RNA8-JBGS].
66. Bjorklund, supra note 61 at 1271.
67. See Tomoko Ishikawa, “THIRD PARTY PARTICIPATION IN INVESTMENT TREATY
ARBITRATION” (2010) 59 Intl & Comp LQ 373 at 374-75.
68. See generally Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford
University Press, 2007); Stephan W Schill, “Enhancing International Investment Law’s
Legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law Approach”
(2011) 52 Va J Intl L 57; Stephan W Schill, ed, International Investment Law and
Comparative Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2010).
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nature of investment claims.69 Without delving into the debate, I adopt the latter
view; I characterize ISA as a hybrid regime that combines a public law model
of adjudication with the procedures of international commercial arbitration.70
Tis characterization helps us to appreciate the parallels between ISA and BHR
arbitration. It also refects the special character of ISA as a forum in international
law where MNCs and states have standing.
Notwithstanding the procedural similarities between both arbitral
structures,71 the subject matter in ISA difers substantially from that of commercial
arbitration.72 International commercial arbitration is concerned with the
adjudication of private rights between two parties established under a contract.
However, ISA resolves disputes between states as sovereign entities and their
obligation towards foreign investors. In efect, while international commercial
arbitration determines reciprocal duties and obligations between private parties,
ISA determines only the obligation of states towards foreign investors.73 Tis is
because “the main objective of contemporary investment treaty arbitration is to
assess whether or not the state has violated its obligations under the applicable
investment treaty and other applicable rules and principles of international law.”74
In sum, “[ISA] as we know it today provides preferences to foreign investors,

69. See generally Zachary Douglas, “Te Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration”
(2003) 74 British Yearbook Intl L 151; Bernado M Cremades & David JA Caims, “Te
Brave New World of Global Arbitration” (2002) 3 J World Investment 173.
70. See Hendrik Hugh Angus Van Harten, Te Emerging System of International Investment
Arbitration (PHD Tesis, London School of Economics, 2005) [unpublished] at 10-11.
71. See Choudhury, supra note 33 at 787.
72. See James Allsop, “Commercial and Investor-State Arbitration: Te Importance of
Recognising their Diferences” (Opening Keynote Address delivered at Te ICCA Congress,
Sydney, 16 April 2018) [unpublished] at para 21.
73. See “Human rights must be integrated into international investment agreements” (14
November 2016), online (pdf ): Business and Human Rights Resource Center <www.
business-humanrights.org/sites/default/fles/documents/Human-rights%2Binvestmentagreements-statement-14-Nov-2016.pdf> [perma.cc/3DF2-T4WD] (“[T]he current
international investment system gives rights to multinational corporations while doing
nothing to protect the rights of people afected by foreign investment to access efective
remedy. It does not sufciently protect governments’ space to pursue sustainable
development policies from investors’ challenges”).
74. De Brabandere, supra note 44 at 51.
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in comparison to local stakeholders including domestic investors as well as third
parties impacted by the foreign investment.”75
Considering investors’ lack of reciprocal obligations in ISA proceedings,
it is unclear why host states agree to arbitral clauses in BITs.76 One of the reasons
for including an arbitration clause in BITs is to assure foreign investors of the
security of their investments, which will, in turn, encourage FDI—a situation
which some commentators argue will foster economic development in host
states.77 In efect, these commentators equate FDI to economic development.
However, the circumstances under which most BITs are concluded make this
argument narrow.78 Host states still have an independent obligation to improve
the economic lives of their citizens because FDI is not a substitute for strong
domestic property rights, good governance, and strong democratic institutions,

75. Kinda Mohamadieh, “Te Future of Investor-State Dispute Settlement Deliberated at
UNCITRAL: Unveiling a Dichotomy between Reforming and Consolidating the Current
Regime” (March 2019) at 2, online (pdf ): Te South Centre <www.southcentre.int/
wp-content/uploads/2019/03/IPB16_Te-Future-of-ISDS-Deliberated-at-UNCITRAL_
EN.pdf> [perma.cc/X8QV-SM3C].
76. It should, however, be noted that some BITs are beginning to recognize obligations for
investors, although these remain limited. For example, article 7 of the 2019 Netherlands
Model bilateral investment treaty (BIT) provides a specifc requirement that “[i]nvestors
and their investments shall comply with domestic laws and regulations of the host state,
including laws and regulations on human rights.” See “Netherlands model Investment
Agreement” (22 March 2019), online (pdf ): UNCTAD <investmentpolicy.unctad.org/
international-investment-agreements/treaty-fles/5832/download> [perma.cc/6JL3-6YE9].
77. See Augustus A Agyemang, “AFRICAN COURTS, THE SETTLEMENT OF
INVESTMENT DISPUTES AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF AWARDS” (1989) 33
J Afr L 31 at 42; St John, supra note 42 at 255; Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 35 at 20;
Salacuse, supra note 47 at 440-44 (noting that other reasons include: “(2) relationship
building; (3) economic liberalization; (4) encouraging domestic investment; and (5)
improving governance and strengthening rule of law”).
78. See Susan D Franck, “Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and the
Rule of Law” (2007) 19 Pac McGeorge Global Bus & Dev LJ 337 at 339; Jason Webb
Yackee, “Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints
from Alternative Evidence” (2011) 51 Va J Intl L 397; Jason Yackee, “DO BITS REALLY
WORK? REVISITING THE EMPIRICAL LINK BETWEEN INVESTMENT TREATIES
AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT” in Karl P Sauvant & Lisa E Sachs, eds,
THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT
FLOWS (Oxford University Press, 2009) 379 at 381-82.
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which are factors for development in any state.79 Terefore, developing countries’
submission of their sovereign powers in BITs with the expectation of economic
development may not necessarily materialize without their independent and
concerted eforts to implement favourable economic policies.80 Tis is because
FDI can have positive and negative efects on host states—it can exponentially
improve states’ economic growth through job creation, increase in capital fow,
and transfer of new technologies;81 it can also constrain state policies, cause
negative environmental disasters, and generate gross human rights abuses.82
ISA tribunals’ interpretation of BITs negatively afects host states’ regulatory
space because tribunals protect investors’ economic objectives at the expense of

79. See Mary Hallward-Driemeier, “Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract Foreign Direct
Investment? Only a Bit ... and Tey Could Bite” (2003) Te World Bank Development
Research Group Policy Research Working Paper No 3121 at 2. See also Andrew Newcombe,
“Sustainable Development and Investment Treaty Law” (2007) 8 World Investment & Trade
357 at 358 (noting that an investment treaty is not concomitant to development because
“FDI fows occur within a complex framework of public and private international law”).
80. As a result, some developing countries are terminating BITS with developed countries. See
Diana Marie Wick, “THE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVITY OF ICSID DENUNCIATION
AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE” (2012) 11 J Intl Bus & L 239; Salacuse, supra note
47 at 472-73. For example, South Africa, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Bolivia and
Ecuador have terminated and signalled their intention to terminate BITs. See Butler &
Subedi, supra note 37 at 44. Indeed, the Ecuadorian president declared that its “withdrawal
from the ICSID is necessary for ‘the liberation of our countries because [it] signifes
colonialism, slavery with respect to transnationals, with respect to Washington, with respect
to the World Bank.’” See “ICSID in crisis: Straight-jacket or investment protection?” (10
July 2009) online: Bretton Woods Project <www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-564878>
[perma.cc/QM77-NZ2Y].
81. See Halil Kukaj & Faruk B Ahmeti, “Te Importance Of Foreign Direct Investments On
Economic Development In Transitional Countries: A Case Study Of Kosovo” (2016) 12:7
ESJ 288 (noting that FDI contributes to economic development in two main ways: (1)
“augmentation of domestic capital,” and (2) “the enhancement of efciency through the
transfer of new technology, marketing and managerial skills, innovation, and best practices”).
82. See Jiajia Zheng & Pengfei Sheng, “Te Impact of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on
the Environment: Market Perspectives and Evidence from China” (2017) 5:1 Economies
1; Hasrat Arjjumend, “REGULATORY CHILL, CORPORATE TAKEOVER AND
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE” (2017) 6 Intl J Current Advanced Research 7923;
David Shea Bettwy, “THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT: ADDRESSING THE NEED FOR AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK”
(2012) 11 Rich J Global L & Bus 239 at 242-43.
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host states’ public regulatory powers.83 ISA tribunals’ interpretation of BITs afects
host states’ regulatory space in two ways: (1) through compensatory awards in
cases of an alleged breach of investors’ proprietary rights, and (2) through host
states’ fear of arbitration claims, which discourage them from taking legitimate
regulatory measures to protect human rights or the environment (regulatory
chill).84 In efect, host states’ sovereignty to make and enforce law for the good
of their citizens is largely undermined because of the ISA tribunal’s interpretive
role. Terefore, in addition to potentially promoting FDI, “[ISA] clearly
poses a signifcant threat to the paradigm of public health, human rights, and
sustainable development.”85
Indeed, most investment disputes arise from host states’ administrative or
executive regulatory powers in response to local community pressure.86 Host state
obligations to local communities trigger investment claims in two scenarios. Te
frst is where local community mobilization prompts state action—that is, local
communities object to the investment approval process or the implementation
of projects through mass protest or litigation, which prompts host states, in the
exercise of their regulatory powers, to take actions that adversely afect investors’

83. See Joshua Boone, “HOW DEVELOPING COUNTRIES CAN ADAPT CURRENT
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES TO PROVIDE BENEFITS TO THEIR
DOMESTIC ECONOMIES” (2011) 1 Global Bus L Rev 187 at 188; Johannes Schwarzer,
“Investor-State Dispute Settlement: An Anachronism Whose Time Has Gone” (December
2018), online (pdf ): Te South Center <www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/
IPB12_Investor-State-Dispute-Settlement-An-Anachronism-Whose-Time-Has-Gone_
EN.pdf> [perma.cc/8CHZ-T89W]. Schwarzer argues that ISA is counterproductive to
developing states.
84. See Kyla Tienhaara, “Regulatory chill and the threat of arbitration: A view from political
science” in Chester Brown & Kate Miles, eds, Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and
Arbitration (Cambridge University Press, 2011).
85. Matthew Rimmer, “THE CHILLING EFFECT: INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT, GRAPHIC HEALTH WARNINGS, THE PLAIN PACKAGING OF
TOBACCO PRODUCTS, AND THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP” (2017) 7
Victoria UL & Just J 76 at 85.
86. See Jeremy Caddel & Nathan M Jensen, “Which host country government actors are most
involved in disputes with foreign investors,” (2014) 120 Columbia FDI Perspectives 1.
See e.g. Pac Rim Cayman LLC v the Republic of El Salvador (2016), (International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (Arbitrators: Professor Dr Guido Santiago Tawil,
Professor Brigitte Stern, VV Veeder Esq).
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proprietary interests.87 Second, it may arise from host states’ inaction—that
is, in situations where host states fail to protect foreign investment in the
face of, for example, physical security risks posed by of local communities to
investors’ property.88
However, although the reason for a treaty breach may be a host state’s
need to respond to public concerns relating to environmental protection and
human rights, ISA tribunals rarely consider human rights and environmental
factors as sufcient to justify interference with the private rights of investors.89
Te marginal role of human rights and public considerations in ISA awards may
be attributed to many factors, including the tribunal’s composition of persons
trained in commercial law and ISA’s history of protecting investors’ economic
interests.90 However, a more plausible reason is the tribunals’ neglect of local
communities’ contribution in the analysis of investment rights and obligations.91
87. See Lorenzo Cotula & Mika Schröder, “Community perspectives in investor-state
arbitration” (2017) at 10-19, online (pdf ): International Institute for Environment and
Development <pubs.iied.org/sites/default/fles/pdfs/migrate/12603IIED.pdf> [perma.cc/
NR3B-JWW5]. See e.g. Aguas del Tunari, SA v Republic of Bolivia (2005), (International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (Arbitrators: David D Caron, José Luis
Alberro-Semerena, Henri C Alvarez) [Aguas]; Metaclad Corporation v Te United Mexican
States (2000), (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (Arbitrators:
Professor Sir Elihu Lauterpacht QC CBE, Mr Benjamin R Civiletti, Mr José Luis Siqueiros);
Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, SA v Te United Mexican States (2003), (International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (Arbitrators: Dr Horacio A Grigera Naón,
Prof José Carlos Fernández Rozas, Mr Carlos Bernal Verea).
88. See e.g. Vestey Group Limited v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (2016), (International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (Arbitrators: Professor Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler,
Professor Horacio Grigera Naón, Professor Pierre-Marie Dupuy).
89. See e.g., Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena SA v Republic of Costa Rica (2000) at para 72,
(International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (Arbitrators: L Yves Fortier CC
QC, Sir Elihu Lauterpacht CBE QC, Professor Prosper Weil) (holding that “[e]xpropriatory
environmental measures—no matter how laudable and benefcial to society as a whole—are,
in this respect, similar to any other expropriatory measures that a state may take in order to
implement its policies: where property is expropriated, even for environmental purposes,
whether domestic or international, the state’s obligation to pay compensation remains”).
But see Yannick Radi, “Philip Morris v Uruguay: Regulatory Measures in International
Investment Law: To be or Not To Be Compensated” (2018) 33 ICSID Rev 74.
90. See Jason Webb Yackee, “PACTA SUNT SERVANDA AND STATE PROMISES TO
FOREIGN INVESTORS BEFORE BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: MYTH
AND REALITY” (2009) 32 Fordham Intl LJ 1550 at 1611.
91. See Perrone, “Weakest Voices,” supra note 16 at 384. See generally Odumosu, supra note
14; Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, “A Law for need or a Law for Greed?: Restoring the
Lost Law in the International Law of Foreign Investment” (2006) 6 Intl Environment
Agreements 329 at 332.
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Recognizing local community participatory rights in ISA proceedings may
fundamentally change how tribunals interpret rights and obligations fowing
from BITs or investment agreements. Te next section examines this neglected
area. It argues that the existing procedure in ISA is inadequate to secure support
for local community participatory rights.

II. LOCAL COMMUNITY REPRESENTATION—A SUPERFLUOUS
OR NECESSARY RIGHT IN ISA PROCEEDINGS?
It is arguable that, because human rights and environmental protection
arguments play a marginal role in ISA proceedings, it is unnecessary to allow
local communities, who are directly impacted by investors’ human rights and
environmental abuse, to seek redress in ISA proceedings. Even if it is conceded
that local community participation is necessary in ISA proceedings, it is arguable
that states, as representatives of their citizens under international law, competently
represent local community interests.92 It has been noted in support of this position
that “the crucial task of the IIR [international investment regime] is reviewing
state behaviour after the establishment of the investment, and drawing the correct
line between foreign investor rights and the state’s regulatory authority.”93
Te foregoing argument, however, treats local communities as an absent
actor in international investment law. It assumes that a state is an abstract
entity whose interest always aligns with the local populace. Tis assumption is
erroneous because local community interests may sometimes be at odds with
states’ interests.94 Terefore, in such cases, host states may not be motivated to
raise public concerns in ISA proceedings. For example, in cases where investors
demand that states should ensure local communities’ free and prior informed
consent before embarking on investment projects, states’ failure to obtain such
approval before signing a BIT may amount to willful negligence that may
establish their liability in an ISA proceeding.95 Also, states may not be motivated
to further community interests in cases where they are complicit in human rights
and environmental abuses. Tese situations cause a confict of interest between
states and local communities, which may dissuade states from advancing local
92. See generally Mark Chinen, “Complexity Teory and the Horizontal and Vertical
Dimensions” (2014) 25 Eur J Intl L 703.
93. See Perrone, “Weakest Voices,” supra note 16 at 385.
94. See generally Perrone, “Invisible Local Communities,” supra note 16.
95. See Cotula & Schröder, supra note 87 at 3. In such cases, investors may claim that the state
failed to guarantee the physical security of their investments.
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community interests in ISA proceedings. Terefore, it is difcult to argue that
states represent community interests in these cases.96
Again, it is arguable that the submission of amicus curiae briefs to ISA
tribunals is an opportunity for local communities to present environmental
protection and human rights perspectives to treaty claims.97 Rule 37(2) of
the ICSID Rules provides that “[a]fter consulting both parties, the Tribunal
may allow a person or entity that is not a party to the dispute (in this Rule
called the ‘non-disputing party’) to fle a written submission with the Tribunal
regarding a matter within the scope of the dispute.”98 Terefore, the submission
of a non-disputing party (NDP) brief is an opportunity for civil societies and
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to raise the negative impacts of
investors’ activities on local communities in ISA proceedings.99 Indeed, it has
been noted that “the increased acceptance in international dispute settlement of
NGO participation as amici curiae can be hailed as ‘permitt[ing] the emergence
in international law of the idea of civil society as an important participant in the
resolution of investment disputes.’”100
However, submission of NDP briefs is an insufcient procedure to represent
local community interest or in ISA proceedings because “amicus was never meant
as a substitute for the right of standing.”101 Aside from the fact that they “are
96. Ibid.
97. Francioni argues that “amicus curiae participation has become and will remain in the
foreseeable future an important feature of the administration of justice in the ﬁeld of foreign
investments.” Francesco Francioni, “Access to Justice, Denial of Justice and International
Investment Law” (2009) 20 Eur J Intl L 729 at 740. See also Joseph (Yusuf ) Saei (2017)
“Amicus curious: structure and play in investment arbitration” (2017) 8 Transnat’l
Legal Teory 247.
98. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID CONVENTION,
REGULATIONS AND RULES, (ICSID, 2006) [ICSID Rules]; Article 15 of the UNCITRAL
Rules has a similar provision. See UNCITRAL, Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based
Investor-State Arbitration, (UN, 2021) at 36 [UNCITRAL Rules].
99. See James Harrison, “Human Rights Arguments in Amicus Curiae Submissions: Promoting
Social Justice?” in Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann & Francesco Francioni,
eds, Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration (Oxford University Press,
2009) 396 at 413 (“[t]he language and obligations of human rights is the chosen method by
which a great number of amici have chosen to frame their arguments. Te noise of ‘social
justice’ is translated into the ‘signal’ of human rights”).
100. Dr Eric De Brabandere, “NGOs and the ‘Public Interest’: Te Legality and Rationale of
Amicus Curiae Interventions in International Economic and Investment Disputes” (2011)
12 Chi J Intl L 85 at 111, citing Francioni, supra note 97 at 742.
101. Van Harten, Kelsey & Schneiderman, supra note 19 at 4. See also Fernando Dias Simoes,
“Myopic Amici: Te Participation of Non-Disputing Parties in ICSID Arbitration” (2017)
42 NCJ Intl L 791.
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grossly underutilised,” their scope and application are limited.102 Tis is because,
unless investors’ human rights abuse is in issue or put in issue by one of the parties
during the proceeding, an NDP brief remains inadmissible.103 Since arbitrators
have discretionary powers to admit or reject NDP briefs, it is not uncommon to
reject NDP briefs on this ground.104 Terefore, ISA tribunals have the power but
no obligation to accept NDP briefs.105
Similarly, NDP briefs can be admitted only in cases where third parties
are neutral and independent. Where the NDP has a connection to one of the
parties (even a distant one), the NDP may be adjudged as biased.106 Terefore,
ISA tribunals may reject a brief because the NDP has a strong public interest
in the outcome of the proceedings. For example, it has been held that, where
the NDP’s participation will unfairly prejudice the claimant through its public
interests, the brief ought to be rejected.107 Te independence and neutrality
criteria for accepting NDP briefs raise peculiar complexities when interpreted
together with Rule 37(2) of the ICSID Rules, which requires NDPs to have
“signifcant interest” in ISA proceedings. It is difcult to imagine NGOs and

102. Nicolette Butler, “Non-Disputing Party Participation in ICSID Disputes: Faux Amici?”
(2019) 66 Nethl Intl L Rev 143 at 172.
103. See Bernhard von Pezold and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe (2012) at para 57, (International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (Arbitrators: Mr L Yves Fortier CC QC,
Professor David AR Williams QC, Professor An Chen) [Bernhard].
104. See Harrison, supra note 99 at 415 (noting that “[t]here is no general legal principle
which gives rise to an obligation upon a tribunal to consider, either explicitly or implicitly,
arguments made by an amicus curiae”). See also Bernhard, supra note 103 at para 62.
105. See Aguas, supra note 87; Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, “Chevron v Ecuador: Te
arbitral tribunal in Chevron v. Ecuador has heightened concerns about the legitimacy of
the proceedings after it closed them of to the public” (April 2011), online: International
Institute for Sustainable Development <www.iisd.org/project/chevron-v-ecuador>
[perma.cc/W6V6-G55E].
106. See Lucas Bastin, “Amici Curiae in Investor-State Arbitration: Eight Recent Trends” (2014)
30 Arb Intl 125 at 141.
107. See Bernhard, supra note 103 at para 62 (“We are of the view that the circumstances
surrounding these Petitioners are such that the Claimants may be unfairly prejudiced by their
participation and the Application must therefore be denied”).
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civil organizations, who represent a substantial (public) interest,108 maintaining
neutrality or independence from a local community or host state’s cause.109
Even if ISA tribunals unconditionally accept NDP briefs, NDPs are not
physically represented in any aspect of ISA proceedings, and the tribunals limit the
length and number of the briefs.110 NDPs are therefore not privy to the tribunals’
records or documents submitted by parties.111 In any event, it is doubtful whether
the submission of briefs enhances NDPs’ access to justice in ISA proceedings. For
example, at a United Nations’ round table discussion on access to justice in ISA
proceedings, a participant, who is a member of the local community, noted that
“if you believe amicus works, that is false.”112 Another participant lamented that
“[t]hey were talking about my land, my territory, my life, my existence, but I didn’t
have a voice.”113 In sum, it is important to diferentiate between participation by
“afected persons” (local communities) and participation by “concerned persons”
(amicus curiae).114 While the former is personal, the latter is indirect.
As such, although investment activities negatively afect local communities,
they remain invisible in ISA proceedings.115 In United Parcel Service of America
Inc v Government of Canada (“United Parcel”), the tribunal noted that third

108. See Methanex Corporation v United States of America (2005) 44 ILM 1345 at para 35
(International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (Arbitrators: William Rowley
QC, Warren Christopher Esq, VV Veeder QC) [Methanex] (“Amici are not experts; such
third persons are advocates (in the non-pejorative sense) and not ‘independent’ in that they
advance a particular case to a tribunal”); Rule 37(2) of the ICSID Rules mandates that,
to qualify as amici, a non-disputing party must have a signifcant interest in the proceeding.
See ICSID Rules, supra note 98 at 117.
109. See Eugenia Levine, “Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration: Te
Implications of an Increase in Tird-Party Participation” (2011) 29 BJIL 200 at 215-16.
110. See United Parcel Service of America Inc v Government of Canada (2001) at para 69,
(International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (Arbitrators: Dean Ronald A
Cass, L Yves Fortier CC QC, Justice Kenneth Keith) [United Parcel].
111. Ibid.
112. Michelle Chan & Kanika Gupta, “Impacts of the International Investment Regime
on Access to Justice: Roundtable Outcome Document (18 October 2017) at 9, online
(pdf ): UN OHCHR <www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/CCSI_UNWGBHR_
InternationalInvestmentRegime.pdf> [perma.cc/G765-8VST].
113. Ibid.
114. See Odumosu, “ICSID,” supra note 14 at 314.
115. See Odumosu, “Locating Tird World Resistance,” supra note 14 at 436. See also Katia Fach
Gomez, “RETHINKING THE ROLE OF AMICUS CURIAE IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: HOW TO DRAW THE LINE FAVORABLY FOR
THE PUBLIC INTEREST” (2012) 35 Fordham Intl LJ 510 at 528.
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parties are not rights holders in investment arbitration.116 It held that parties to
ISA proceedings are investors and states respectively. Also, the tribunal in Corn
Products International, Inc. v Mexico held that “[t]he paradigm in investor-States
disputes, . . . is a dispute between the frst party (nearly always the investor)
as plaintif and the second party (nearly always the host state or state agency)
as respondent. Tere is no third party.”117 Tese decisions portray states as “a
not-so-abstract but artiﬁcial entity without a population, viewed only as the
government and territory.”118 It neglects the socio-political and economic context
that surrounds local community participation in the investment regime.119
Tis state of afairs is a major drawback in the access to justice campaign in
ISA proceedings.120
It is no gainsaying that there is a need for an inclusive structure that creates
corresponding rights and obligations between investors, host states, and local
communities in ISA proceedings. However, this access to justice problem poses
a dilemma—it raises the question of whether to reform ISDS or create a new
international dispute resolution framework that refects an inclusive structure.
Although some commentators argue that ISDS cannot accommodate this
inclusive reform,121 other scholars enthusiastically support the reform within
the ISDS regime.122 Te next section contributes to this debate—it examines
116. United Parcel, supra note 110 at para 41. Te Tribunal held that “[t]he Investor and Canada
are the parties whose rights and obligations are to be determined by the arbitration, and no
one else’s.” See also Methanex, supra note 108 at para 27.
117. Case No ARB(AF)/04/01 (2009), at para 4 (International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes) (Arbitrator: Andreas F Lowenfeld).
118. Odumosu, “Locating Tird World Resistance,” supra note 14 at 445 (“By discounting
popular protests in investment dispute settlement, the state is constructed as a not-so-abstract
but artiﬁcial entity without a population, viewed only as the government and territory”).
119. Rajagopal condemns the oversimplifcation of local actors’ role in social movements.
He objects to the role of traditional state as the sole defender of the rights of individuals and
communities. See Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law from Below: Development, Social
Movements, and Tird World Resistance (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 11-13.
120. Indeed, it has been noted that “[h]istorically, investor-state arbitration emerged out of a
concern to ‘depoliticise’ investment disputes, placing their settlement within the purview
of legal adjudication. As would be expected, arbitral jurisprudence emphasises the legal,
technical dimensions of disputes. But it also struggles to understand and address the
inevitable political dimensions.” See Cotula & Schröder, supra note 87 at 24.
121. See generally Perrone “Invisible Local Communities,” supra note 16.
122. See Laryea, supra note 8; Barnali Choudhury, “SPINNING STRAW INTO GOLD:
INCORPORATING THE BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA INTO
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS” (2017) 38 U Pa J Intl L 425;
P Acconci, “Is It Time to Integrate Non-investment Concerns into International Investment
Law?” (2013) 10 TDM 1.
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the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,123 and
the proposal to solve disputes relating to businesses’ human rights abuse with a
special BHR arbitration mechanism. It asks whether BHR arbitration is a more
efcient means to give local communities access to justice than an ISDS reform.

III. ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR LOCAL COMMUNITIES—A BETTER
MODEL IN BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS ARBITRATION?
Te United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (Guiding
Principles) is a product of the United Nations High Commissioner’s mandate
to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) on the issue of
human rights, transnational corporations, and other business enterprises.124 Te
SRSG was charged with the obligation to produce a report that would identify
standards of corporate social responsibility (CSR), clarify often used CSR
concepts such as “complicity” and “sphere of infuence,” develop materials and
methodologies for human rights impact assessments, compile best practices of
states and corporations, and elaborate on the regulatory role of states with regard
to human rights.125 In 2011, the SRSG, John Ruggie, completed his work and
submitted the Guiding Principles, a set of thirty-one recommendations containing
foundational and operational principles, to the United Nations Human Rights
Council.126 Te Council unanimously approved the document.127 Although there
had been previous eforts, the Guiding Principles became the frst widely accepted

123. UNOHCHR, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United
Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, (UN, 2011) [Guiding Principles].
124. See generally Martin Jena & Karen E Bravo, Te Business and Human Rights Landscape:
Moving Forward, Looking Back (Cambridge University Press, 2015).
125. UN Commission on Human Rights, Human Rights Resolution 2005/69: Human Rights
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, UNOHCHR, 2005,
UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2005/69 at 1.
126. See UN Human Rights Council, Human rights and transnational corporations and other
business enterprises, UNHRC, 17th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/17/4 (2011).
127. Ibid at 4; Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, UNHRC, 17th
Sess, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (2011) [Report to UNHRC].
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standard document that seeks to prevent and address the risk of adverse impact
on human rights linked to business activities.128
Te Guiding Principles’ conceptual framework is grounded in the three
pillars of “Protect, Respect, and Remedy.”129 To implement the third pillar—that
is, providing victims of human rights violations in the course of business greater
access to an efective remedy130—a private group of international practicing
lawyers and academics under the aegis of the Center for International Cooperation
proposed a special international arbitration where local communities can claim
compensatory damages for environmental protection and human rights abuse
arising from business activities in host states.131
Tis new face of international arbitration is regulated by the procedural
framework of the Hague Rules, which are based on the 2013 UNCITRAL

128. See generally John Gerard Ruggie, “Te Social Construction of the UN Guiding Principles
on Business & Human Rights” (2017) HKS Working Paper No RWP17-030; John G
Ruggie, “Presentation of Report to United Nations Human Rights Council, Professor John
G Ruggie, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Business and Human Rights”
(Opening Statement delivered at the UNHRC, Geneva 30 May 2011) [unpublished].
129. Report to UNHRC, supra note 127 at para 6:
Te frst is the State duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, including
business enterprises, through appropriate policies, regulation, and adjudication. Te second
is the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, which means that business enterprises
should act with due diligence to avoid infringing on the rights of others and to address adverse
impacts with which they are involved. Te third is the need for greater access by victims to
efective remedy, both judicial and non-judicial. Each pillar is an essential component in an
inter-related and dynamic system of preventative and remedial measures: the State duty to
protect because it lies at the very core of the international human rights regime; the corporate
responsibility to respect because it is the basic expectation society has of business in relation
to human rights; and access to remedy because even the most concerted eforts cannot
prevent all abuse.

See generally, John Ruggie, “REPORT OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES”
(2011) 29 Netherlands Q Human Rights 224.
130. See Jonathan Drimmer & Lisa J Laplante, “Te Tird Pillar: Remedies, Reparation, and the
Ruggie Principles” in Jena Martin & Karen E Bravo, eds, Te Business and Human Rights
Landscape: Moving Forward, Looking Back (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 316 at 323.
131. See “Te Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration” online: Center for
International Legal Cooperation <www.cilc.nl/project/the-hague-rules-on-business-andhuman-rights-arbitration/> [perma.cc/HTL5-K4R6].
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Arbitral Rules.132 Te “Draft Arbitration Rules on Business and Human Rights”
(Draft Rules) was released in June 2019 by the Business and Human Rights
Arbitration Working Group133 and was ofcially launched at a ceremony in Te
Hague on 12 December 2019.134 Generally, the Hague Rules focus on the special
requirements of human rights issues in business disputes.135 Tey are drafted in
a way that ensures that the BHR arbitral structure meets the Guiding Principles’
requirements of legitimacy, equitability, procedural transparency, accessibility,
predictability, and rights-compatibility of outcomes.136 In efect, the Hague
Rules provide a set of procedures for the arbitration of disputes related to the
impact of businesses on human rights. Te scope of the Hague Rules is not
limited to the type of parties to the arbitration proceedings. Parties can extend
the scope of arbitrable issues if they agree to resolve the issues with the Hague
Rules. To be clear, the Hague Rules do not create new international obligations,
rather they are a voluntary procedural tool for dispute settlement that parties
can choose to apply to resolve their disputes.137 Essentially, it is the adoption of
the Hague Rules that classifes an arbitration proceeding as a BHR arbitration.
In other words, notwithstanding the subject matter of the dispute or the form of
132. Claes Cronstedt, Jan Eijsbouts & Robert C Tompson, “International arbitration: remedy
for victims in business and human rights disputes” (10 February 2017), online (blog):
Business & Human Rights Resource Centre <https://www.business-humanrights.org/fr/
derni%C3%A8res-actualit%C3%A9s/international-arbitration-remedy-for-victims-inbusiness-and-human-rights-disputes/> [perma.cc/L7AT-Q4Q4].
133. See Bruno Simma et al, “DRAFT ARBITRATION RULES ON BUSINESS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS” (2019) online (pdf ): Center for International Legal Cooperation <www.
cilc.nl/cms/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Draft-BHR-Rules-Final-version-for-Publicconsultation.pdf> [perma.cc/B5N9-EW2N] [Draft Rules].
134. See Judge Bruno Simma et al, “Te Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights
Arbitration” (2019) online (pdf ): Center for International Legal Cooperation <www.cilc.nl/
cms/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Te-Hague-Rules-on-Business-and-Human-RightsArbitration_CILC-digital-version.pdf> [perma.cc/3ZXU-JFF9] [Simma, “Hague Rules”].
135. Ibid.
136. Ibid. See also Bruno Simma et al, “INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION OF BUSINESS
AND HUMAN RIGHTS DISPUTE: ELEMENTS FOR CONSIDERATION IN
DRAFT ARBITRAL RULES, MODEL CLAUSES, AND OTHER ASPECTS OF
THE ARBITRAL PROCESS” (2018) at 5, online (pdf ): Center for International
Legal Cooperation <https://www.cilc.nl/cms/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/
Elements-Paper_INTERNATIONAL-ARBITRATION-OF-BUSINESS-AND-HUMANRIGHTS-DISPUTE.font12.pdf> [perma.cc/2F2S-QEX2] [Simma, “Draft Elements”].
137. See Simma, “Hague Rules,” supra note 134 at 13 (“[n]othing in these Rules should be
read as creating new international legal obligations or as limiting or undermining any legal
obligations a State may have undertaken or be subject to under international law with respect
to human rights”).
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the parties’ agreement (whether contract or treaty), once parties adopt the Hague
Rules to resolve the dispute, the proceedings become a BHR arbitration.138
Terefore, the Hague Rules may generally be described as a bespoke
arbitration procedural rule that could be applied to disputes arising from various
industries including commerce, sports, labour, trade, and investment. Parties
to the arbitration agreement may include “business entities, individuals, labor
unions and organizations, States, State entities, international organizations and
civil society organizations, as well as any other parties of any kind.”139 By adopting
the Hague Rules, parties impliedly deem their disputes to have arisen out of a
commercial relationship as stated in Article 1 of the New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention).140
Parties, especially states, also expressly agree to waive immunity relating to the
execution of the arbitration award when adopting the Hague Rules.141 It should
be noted, however, that the Hague Rules do not address issues relating to the
enforcement of arbitral awards, which are governed by national laws and various
treaty obligations, including, in most cases, the New York Convention.142 Also, the
Hague Rules do not address other modalities for ensuring compliance with an
award, such as monitoring by intergovernmental institutions, non-governmental
organizations, or multi-stakeholder initiatives.
Te Hague Rules aim to provide a means for rights holders whose human
rights are infringed by business activities to access efective remedies, as well
as serving as a risk management strategy for businesses themselves. Terefore,
businesses, in proceedings to enforce their contractual human rights obligations,
for example in supply chain and development contracts, can adopt the Hague
Rules. Te International Bureau of Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)
is the repository institution for BHR arbitration.143 Where parties have not
agreed on an arbitrator, the appointing authority is the Secretary-General of
the PCA.144 Parties can agree to submit their disputes to a BHR Arbitral panel
either contractually or in a treaty. Tis is because Article 1(1) of the Hague Rules
provides that “[w]here parties have agreed that disputes between them in respect
138. Article 1 (1) of the Hague Rules provides that “[t]he characterization of the dispute as
relating to business and human rights is not necessary for jurisdiction where all the parties to
the arbitration have agreed to settle a dispute under these Rules.” Ibid, art 1(1).
139. Ibid at 3.
140. Ibid, art 1(2).
141. Ibid.
142. Ibid at 4.
143. Ibid, art 1(5).
144. Ibid, art 6.
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of a defned legal relationship, whether contractual or not, shall be referred to
arbitration under these Rules, then such disputes shall be settled in accordance
with these Rules.”145
Te Hague Rules are meant to be employed where it is reasonable to presume
that all parties have a minimum of resources at their disposal to cover the basic
costs of the arbitration and their own representation, either by themselves or
through a “legal aid” system, contingency funding, or an agreement on the
asymmetric distribution of costs and deposits between the parties. Tis provision
presupposes that the Hague Rules are unsuitable in cases where there is an
imbalance in the parties’ economic power and strength. Reference to the unequal
bargaining power of parties may be a defence to the jurisdiction of a BHR tribunal
that is applying the Hague Rules.146 BHR arbitration is based on a contractual
framework that seeks to settle disputes between victims or local communities and
businesses, which are often MNCs.147 Parties can adopt the Hague Rules in ad
hoc proceedings or proceedings conducted by an arbitral institution. Te BHR
tribunal panel will include arbitrators with expertise appropriate to business and
human rights disputes.148 In efect, the Hague Rules arbitral framework ofers: (1)
a potentially neutral forum for dispute resolution, independent of both parties
and their states; (2) a specialized dispute resolution process wherein parties select
competent and expert adjudicators on their case, (3) the possibility of obtaining
binding awards that are subject to limited judicial intervention and enforceable
across borders, and (4) the autonomy to choose procedural and substantive laws
for the proceedings. In sum, BHR arbitration is a specialized arbitration that
provides a “one-stop contractually-selected forum for [parties and] businesses to
have their BHR disputes solved in a fair, transparent, and unbiased manner.”149
Te BHR Arbitration Working Group describes international arbitration
as holding “great promise” for business and human rights disputes.150 However,
some commentators have indicated some potential challenges. Tey argue that
arbitrating human rights with business claims raises some concerns because (i)
there may not be real consent to arbitrate between victims of human rights abuse
145. Ibid, art 1(1).
146. For example, MNCs may object to the application of the Hague Rules where local
communities cannot provide security for cost or where local communities are unable to
secure the representation of legal aid or contingency fund agreement with third parties.
147. See Cronstedt, Eijsbouts & Tompson, supra note 20.
148. See Antoine Duval & Catherine Dunmore, “Te Case for a Court of Arbitration for Business
and Human Rights” (2018) 2 Asser Institute Intl & European L Policy Brief.
149. Simma, “Draft Elements,” supra note 136 at 5.
150. Cronstedt, Eijsbouts & Tompson, supra note 20.
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and businesses; (ii) there is inequality of arms (bargaining power) between victims
and businesses; (iii) choice of law rules may create uncertainty in the applicable
rules to arbitral proceedings; (iv) the role of states in human rights abuses may
cause jurisdictional problems in the tribunals; (v) enforcement of judgment
may be refused on the ground that human rights are not arbitrable and that the
dispute falls under the public policy exceptions in the New York Convention.151
Some of these concerns, which relate to the suitability of arbitration for human
rights disputes, will be further explored below.
However, beyond these BHR arbitration concerns, parallels can be drawn
between ISA and BHR arbitration. Both systems decentralize and privatize the
decision-making process— they seek to avoid national courts that are dysfunctional,
corrupt, politically infuenced, or unqualifed.152 Also, the ICSID and Hague
Rules are both dependent on parties’ substantive rights and obligations as set
out in treaties and contracts respectively. One fundamental diference, however,
is the nature of protection ofered in both forums. BHR arbitration protects
local communities from investors’ human rights abuses arising from investment
activities. In contrast, ISA protects investors’ proprietary rights from risks arising
from local community and host state activities.153 Similarly, participatory rights
in ISA and BHR arbitration also difer—while local communities do not directly
participate in ISA proceedings, communities have direct access and participation
in BHR arbitration proceedings.154 Te Hague Rules clearly distinguish between

151. See generally Ioana Cismas & Sarah Macrory, “Te Business and Human Rights Regime
under International Law: Remedy without Law?” in J Summers & A Gough, eds, Non-State
Actors and International Obligations: Creation, Evolution and Enforcement (Brill, 2018) at
224; Katerina Yiannibas, “Te Adaptability of International Arbitration: Reforming the
Arbitration Mechanism to Provide Efective Remedy for Business-related Human Rights
Abuses” (2018) 36 Netherlands Q Human Rights 214; Antony Crockett & Marco de Sousa,
“Arbitrating Business and Human Rights Disputes: Viable for Victims?” (2018) 7 Asian
Dispute Rev 104.
152. See Stephan Schill, “Editorial: Te Mauritius Convention on Transparency” (2015) 16 J
World Investment & Trade 201 at 203 (describing “the dominant conceptualization of
investor-State dispute settlement as a form of commercial arbitration and private justice”).
153. See Cronstedt, Eijsbouts & Tompson, supra note 20 at 26.
154. See Simma, “Hague Rules,” supra note 134, art 19(2):
Te arbitral tribunal may allow one or more third persons to join in the arbitration as a
party provided such person is a party to or a third party benefciary of the underlying legal
instrument that includes the relevant arbitration agreement, unless, after giving all parties and
the person or persons to be joined the opportunity to be heard, the arbitral tribunal fnds that
joinder should not be permitted.
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third-party intervention and amicus curiae participation.155 In sum, BHR
arbitration is an inclusive arbitral structure that gives victims of MNC’s human
rights abuses, who would ordinarily be precluded from directly participating in
ISA proceedings, access to justice and efective remedy.
Te parallels between ISA and BHR arbitration raise the question of
whether, considering the prospect of creating a one-stop shop for business
and human rights abuse, BHR arbitration is a necessary governance efort in
international arbitration. In other words, will an ISDS reform that includes
elements of the Hague Rules achieve the same result as BHR arbitration? Te
next section answers this question. It argues that ISDS reform will avoid parallel
arbitration proceedings that are time consuming, costly, and prone to abuse.
Also, it will prevent additional procedural challenges to an area of law that is
largely controversial.

IV. IS BHR ARBITRATION WORTH THE TROUBLE?—
TOWARDS AN ISDS REFORM
Te problem with BHR arbitration starts with its lack of a legitimacy appeal.156
Generally, privatizing disputes through international arbitration generates
procedural and democratic concerns.157 Te legitimacy argument against
international arbitration is exacerbated in proposals that seek to arbitrate human
rights claims. Tis is because “[t]he classical concept of protection of human
rights is generally perceived as appertaining to the public sphere.”158 States
exercise sovereign powers over human rights issues through statutory regulations,
constitutional provisions, and dispute settlement in domestic courts. Te
introduction of BHR arbitration implies that states will surrender their juridical
155. See ibid, art 28.
156. See Stephan Schill, “Conceptions of Legitimacy of International Arbitration” in David
Caron, et al, eds, Practising Virtue: Inside International Arbitration (Oxford University Press,
2015) at 106. See also Report of the Launch Symposium of the Hague Rules on Business and
Human Rights (12 December 2019), online: Center for International Legal Cooperation
<https://www.cilc.nl/cms/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Te-Hague-Rules-on-Business-andHuman-Rights-Arbitration_Launch-Report-.pdf> [https://perma.cc/MDJ7-P3L5].
157. See generally Trevor CW Farrow, Civil Justice, Privatization, and Democracy (University of
Toronto Press, 2013).
158. Frances Raday, “Privatizing Human Rights and the Abuse of Power” (2000) 13 Can JL &
Jur 103 at 103; Hugh Collins, “On the (In)compatibility of Human Rights Discourse and
Private Law” (2012) LSE Law Society and Economy Working Paper No 7/2012, online:
< https://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS201207_Collins.pdf> [https://perma.
cc/LW55-VPKD].
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sovereignty to private arbitrators, in a similar manner as the submission under
the ICSID Convention. It also means that victims and local communities, who
do not have equal bargaining power with MNCs, will be left to negotiate public
adjacent matters without state support or backing. It is difcult to imagine states
(especially developing ones) who are dissatisfed with the present ISA framework
permitting further erosion of their juridical sovereignty through BHR arbitration
because privatizing human rights claims between victims, local communities,
and MNCs has sovereignty implications.
Te independent implementation of BHR arbitration creates a web of
procedural complexities for users, especially when interpreted in light of other
proposals to resolve investment disputes such as the multilateral investment
court,159 ICSID Investor-State Dispute Settlement,160 and the Union of South
American Nations (UNASUR) Arbitration Center.161 Te BHR arbitration
tribunal’s coexistence with these dispute resolution initiatives in investment
law may create fragmentation of international law which may result in parallel
proceedings.162 Te Study Group of the International Law Commission (ILC),
in its 2006 Report, recognizes the fragmentation of international law arising from
duplication of eforts in diferent felds of international law including trade law,
environmental law, investment law, and human rights law as a concerning issue.163
Te ILC Group describes fragmentation as the “emergence of specialized and
159. See generally Hongling Ning & Tong Qi, “Multilateral Investment Court: Te Gap
between the EU and China” (2018) 4 Chines J Global Governance 154. See also, Te
State of the Union, 2017: A Multilateral Investment Court online: European Commission
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/september/tradoc_156042.pdf> [https://
perma.cc/L4EQ-PK9M]; José Manuel Alvarez Zaráte, “Legitimacy Concerns of the
Proposed Multilateral Investment Court: Is Democracy Possible?” (2018) 59 Boston
College L Rev 2765.
160. See About ICSID, online: ICSID <https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/default.aspx>
[https://perma.cc/UP7S-BCWP].
161. See Daniela Páez-Salgado & Fernando Pérez-Lozada, “New Investment Arbitration Center in
Latin America: UNASUR, A Hybrid Example of Success or Failure?” (27 May 2016), online:
Kluwer Arbitration <http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2016/05/27/unasur/>
[https://perma.cc/QKR6-DL7X]. See also “South American Union of Nations Constitutive
Treaty” (2009) 15 L & Bus Rev Americas 465. Te constitutive countries to the UNASUR
Treaty, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru,
Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela, signed the treaty on 23 May 2008.
162. See Choudhury, supra note 122 at 477.
163. See Martti Koskenniemi ed, Fragmentation of International Law: Difculties Arising from the
Diversifcation and Expansion of International Law, UNGA A/CN.4/L.682 Corr.1 (13 April
2006), online: International Law Commission <https://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/
english/a_cn4_l682.pdf> [ https://perma.cc/E5G3-TE8B].
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relatively autonomous spheres of social action and structure... [which in turn] has
been accompanied by the emergence of specialized and (relatively) autonomous
rules or rule-complexes, legal institutions and spheres of legal practice.”164 Te
problem is that the law-making process in a specialized feld of international law
takes place with relative ignorance of the legislative and institutional activities in
adjoining felds—in this case, business and human rights and investment law.
Tis results in confict between rules or rule systems and deviating institutional
practices.165 Te Report defnes a confict as a situation where two rules or
principles suggest diferent ways of dealing with a problem.166
Considering the similarity in the subject matter, parties (states and MNCs),
and instruments that create parties’ obligations in international investment
law and BHR, the introduction of BHR arbitration may be an unnecessary
governance efort.167 Tis is because a state may enter into a contract with a
foreign investor and, at the same time, have a treaty relationship with the
foreign investor’s home state. In such cases, a business or commercial contract
may double as an investment instrument.168 In efect, commercial contracts
play an important role in investment law because states’ obligations can arise
from a treaty or contract.169 Terefore, a foreign investor may rely on an existing
treaty between its home state and the host state to protect itself in a commercial
contract with the host state.170 Indeed, it has been noted that “an investment
164. Ibid at 11.
165. Te Group gave an example of the procedural and institutional complexity arising from
the dispute arising from the “MOX Plant” nuclear facility at Sellafeld, United Kingdom,
where three institutional procedures—an Arbitral Tribunal set up under Annex VII of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the compulsory dispute
settlement procedure under the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment
of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention), and the European Community and
Euratom Treaties within the European Court of Justice (ECJ)—applied to the same facts of a
case. Ibid at 12.
166. Ibid at 19.
167. See Veijo Heiskanen, “Of Capital Import: Te Defnition of ‘Investment’ in International
Investment Law” in Anne K Hofmann, ed, Protection of Foreign Direct Investments through
Modern Treaty Arbitration: Diversity and Harmonisation (Swiss Arbitration Association,
2010) 51 at 53.
168. Article 1(2) provides that “[t]he parties agree that any dispute that is submitted to arbitration
under these Rules shall be deemed to have arisen out of a commercial relationship or
transaction….” Hague Rules, supra note 21, art 1(2).
169. See Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, supra note 53 at 301. Indeed, it has been noted that
BITs facilitate international commercial transactions. See Rudolf Dolzer & Margrete Stevens,
Bilateral Investment Treaties (Leiden: Martinus Nijhof, 1995) at 12.
170. In efect, foreign investors can rely on procedural rights conferred by a treaty between the
host state and their home state. See Bonnitcha, Poulsen & Waibel, supra note 7 at 71.
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treaty would transform a mere contractual obligation between state and investor
into an international law obligation, in particular, if the treaty included a clause
obliging the state to respect such contract.”171 In sum, a BHR issue that arises
from a commercial contract between a state and foreign investor may double as
an investment dispute that falls under a treaty protection.
Specialized autonomous rules of ISA and BHR arbitration that cover
similar issues exacerbate the potential for further fragmentation of international
law.172 Tis is because various facts or multiple causes of action may lead to
an investment or commercial dispute contemporaneously or consecutively.173
Tere are already incidents of parallel proceedings in ISA174 and international
commercial arbitration.175 Adding BHR arbitration to the existing arbitral
regimes exacerbates the potential for fragmentation of international law which
may create parallel proceedings across two or more arbitral regimes.176 It may
be argued that there is no likelihood of parallel proceedings because while ISA
focuses on disputes between MNCs (who are usually claimants) and states, BHR
171. Catherine Yannaca-Small, “Interpretation of the Umbrella Clause in Investment Agreements”
in International Investment Law: Understanding Concepts and Tracking Innovations—A
Companion Volume to International Investment Perspectives (OECD, 2008) at 101.
172. See generally Choudhury, supra note 122.
173. See Hanno Wehland, Te Coordination of Multiple Proceedings in Investment Treaty
Arbitration (Oxford University Press, 2013) at 40, 42, 70-71.
174. See Hanno Wehland, “Te Regulation of Parallel Proceedings in Investor-State Disputes”
(2016) 31 ICSID Rev 576; Robin F Hansen, “Parallel Proceedings in Investor-State Treaty
Arbitration: Responses for Treaty-Drafters, Arbitrators and Parties” (2010) 73 Modern L
Rev 523; Charles N Brower and Jeremy K Sharpe, “Multiple and Conficting International
Arbitral Awards” (2003) 4 J World Investment & Trade 211.
175. See Norah Gallagher, “Parallel Proceedings, Res Judicata and Lis Pendens: Problems
and Possible Solutions” in Loukas A Mistelis & Julian DM Lew, eds, Pervasive Problems
in International Arbitration (Kluwer Law International (2006) at 329; Bernardo M
Cremades, Ignacio Madalena, “Parallel Proceedings in International Arbitration” (2008)
24 Arb Intl 507.
176. Creating BHR arbitration tribunals that touch on investment issues exacerbates the risk of
parallel proceedings, not only with ISA and other investment dispute methods but also with
domestic courts. A parallel proceeding played out in the Bophal case where, notwithstanding
that an Ecuadorian court found Chevron liable for environmental and human rights abuse,
the Permanent Court of Arbitration discharged Chevron from obligations arising from
the court judgment because of Ecuador’s treaty breach. It is arguable that this procedural
maneuvering is one of the reasons why the Bophal community is without legal remedy since
1984. See Apoorva Mandavilli, “Te World’s Worst Industrial Disaster is Still Unfolding,”
Te Atlantic (10 July 2018), online: <https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/07/
the-worlds-worst-industrial-disaster-is-still-unfolding/560726/> [https://perma.
cc/KPH9-FZUQ].
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arbitration focuses on disputes between states, MNCs, and local communities,
as well as businesses inter se. However, this argument overlooks the overlapping
issues that arise from both proceedings. For example, in a case before an ISA
tribunal, a state may raise its human rights and environmental obligation as a
defence to a treaty or contract breach. As stated above, most ISA tribunals do
not consider these factors strong enough to justify a treaty or contract breach.177
Now, with the introduction of BHR arbitration, local communities (and states)
may sue MNCs on the same facts as those before ISA tribunals for human rights
and environmental violations. If the BHR arbitral tribunal fnds in favour of the
claimant(s), it raises the question of whether the BHR arbitration award that
recognizes states’ and MNCs’ breach of human rights can be used as a defence—
or justifcation for a state’s breach of its contractual or treaty obligation—in an
ISA proceeding involving MNCs and states only. Assuming that the BHR award
cannot be used as an outright defence, it raises the question of whether one
award can be set of against another, especially in cases where awards granted
in both arbitral tribunals are almost the same. Te scenario described here,
with its peculiar procedural challenges, could be avoided if local communities
are granted standing in ISA proceedings and can counterclaim against MNCs
for their human rights and environmental violations. Although it is important,
in some ways, to developed specialized regimes, it is more prudent to establish an
investment system where disputes are solved in a one-stop shop.
Apart from the fact that fragmentation of international law that exacerbates the
potential for parallel proceedings will result in increased cost of prosecution, delay
in proceedings, and inconsistent awards,178 it will also have direct implications for
corporate accountability and access to justice for victims of business and human
rights abuse. Tis is because multiple arbitral forums that touch on investment
disputes will contribute to governance and procedural gaps that MNCs may
continue to exploit.179 MNCs that are aware of local communities’ fnancial
177. Contra Debadatta Bose, “David R Aven v Costa Rica: Te Confuence of Corporations,
Public International Law and International Investment Law,” Case Comment, (2020)
35 ICSID Rev 20.
178. See Jan Ole Voss, Te Impact of Investment Treaties on Contracts between Host States and
Foreign Investors (Martinus Nijhof, 2011) at 281. See generally Gilles Cuniberti, “Parallel
Litigation and Foreign Investment Dispute Settlement” (2006) 21 ICSID Rev 381; Vaughan
Lowe, “Res Judicata and the Rule of Law in International Arbitration” (1996) 8 African J
Intl & Comp L 38; Jamie Shookman, “Too Many Forums for Investment Disputes? ICSID
Illustrations of Parallel Proceedings and Analysis” (2010) 27 J Intl Arbitration 361.
179. See Jose Antonio Puppim De Oliveira et al, “Corporations and the ‘Governance Gaps’ for
Sustainable Development: An Exploratory Analysis” (2018) 1 Academy of Management
Annual Meeting Proceedings 17291.
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plight may fle claims in diferent arbitral tribunals and national courts to weaken
victim and local community resistance.180 Issues regarding enforcement of awards
and appropriate jurisdiction to hear claims between local communities and
MNCs are further procedural issues that may increase the fnancial burden of
local communities. Terefore, the fnancial burden of accessing various arbitral
tribunals and courts for enforcement and the potential for corporate procedural
abuse may weaken or discourage victims and local communities from making
even the most viable claim.181
It could be argued that the Hague Rules, when adopted by parties in ISA
proceedings, may serve the same purpose as they would in BHR arbitration
proceedings. Tis is because parties can adopt the Hague Rules in BHR
arbitration or ISA. Indeed, a commentator notes that “BHR Arbitration Rules
[Hague Rules] could be treaty compatible but they are not treaty dependent.”182
Tis statement needs qualifcation. Te Hague Rules are not treaty compatible
with the ICSID Convention. Tis is because parties can only choose Hague Rules
in ISA proceedings if the ICSID Convention supports features of the Hague
Rules. For example, it is doubtful whether the ICSID Convention supports local
communities’ rights to directly participate in ISA proceedings.183Also, Article
1(2) of the Hague Rules limits the scope of BHR arbitration to commercial
relationships only. Tese characteristics of the Hague Rules make it difcult to
argue that the Hague Rules and the ICSID Convention are compatible. Even if
we accept that Hague Rules could be used in ISA proceedings,184 it raises the
question of why this reform efort is not pursued in the ongoing ISDS reform.
It could also be argued that the Hague Rules may support rights fowing
from the Draft Treaty on Business and Human Rights, as promoted by some

180. See Emmanuel Gaillard, “Abuse of Process in International Arbitration” (2017)
32 ICSID Rev 17.
181. See generally Diana Rosert, Te Stakes are High: A Review of the Financial Costs of
Investment Treaty Arbitration (International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2014).
182. Cismas & Macrory, supra note 151 at 237.
183. Te ICSID Convention expressly states that arbitration proceedings shall be conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the Convention (supra note 49 art 44).
184. Article 1(1) of the Hague Rules states “[t]he characterization of the dispute as relating
to business and human rights is not necessary for jurisdiction where all the parties to
the arbitration have agreed to settle a dispute under these Rules.” Hague Rules, supra
note 21, art 1(1).
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developing countries, including Ecuador and South Africa.185 However,
Choudhury questions the introduction of a new business and human treaty, when
IIAs could be reconfgured to include human rights obligations of MNCs.186
According to her, a reconfguration of IIAs to include BHR issues would address
some of the challenges of signing a new Business and Human Rights Treaty.187
Particularly, and persuasively too, Choudhury argues that ISA provides a robust
structure that has the potential to facilitate easy access to remedy for both MNCs
and victims of business and human rights.188 Terefore, although the Hague
Rules can support the proposed business and human rights treaty, the ripple
efect is that the treaty will create an unnecessary fragmentation of international
dispute resolution mechanisms.
Realistically, rather than give victims and local communities access to justice
through a specialized arbitration, the BHR arbitration proposal may beneft only
a few white, educated men—arbitrators. Te proposal may increase the incidence
of arbitrators double hatting across tribunals because international arbitration
comprises a closed network of professionals.189 It may also exacerbate the risk of
confict of interest among arbitrators. In efect, without achieving its intended
efect of providing an efective remedy to victims of business and human rights,
BHR arbitration may create opportunities for small groups of individuals from
developed countries to generate additional income.190 Shihata notes that “[i]t is
185. See Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, in International Human Rights Law, the
Activities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (17 August 2021),
online: United Nations Human Rights Council <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/fles/
Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/Session6/LBI3rdDRAFT.pdf> [https://
perma.cc/6GCJ-RNQJ].
186. Choudhury, supra note 122 at 463.
187. Ibid.
188. Ibid.
189. Double-hatting is a situation where arbitrators play multiple roles as counsel, arbitrators,
expert witness in ad-hoc arbitral proceedings. See e.g. Malcolm Langford, Daniel Behn &
Runar Hilleren Lie, “Te Revolving Door in International Investment Arbitration” (2017)
20 J Intl Econ L 301; Yves Dezalay & Bryant G Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International
Commercial Arbitration and the Construction of a Transnational Legal Order (University
of Chicago Press, 1996) at 20; Sergio Puig, “Social Capital in the Arbitration Market”
(2014) 25 Eur J Intl L 387; Tom Ginsburg, “Te Culture of Arbitration” (2003) 36 Vand J
Transnat’l L 1335. See also Amr A Shalakany, “Arbitration and the Tird World: Bias under
the Scepter of Neo-Liberalism” (2000) 41 Harv Intl LJ 419 at 430. Shalakany argues that
arbitration may be another form of imperialism.
190. Dezalay & Garth, supra note 189 at 10. See also Catherine A Rogers, “Te Vocation of the
International Arbitrator” (2005) 20 Am U Intl L Rev 957. Rogers describes the market for
international arbitration as a closed system that is difcult for newcomers to penetrate.
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no secret that developing countries often see international arbitration as a process
administered, to a large extent, by nationals of the developed countries.”191
Terefore, it is important to inquire about the possible underlying
rationale for the BHR arbitration proposal: Is it to give justice to victims and
local communities who sufer from human rights abuse and socio-economic
impoverishment arising from business activities or to beneft arbitrators and
investors? Victim and local community interest may be marginal in the BHR
arbitration framework. Roberts agrees that this sort of proposal may be motivated
by investors’ and arbitrators’ interests alike. In her words:
First, to the extent that investors do not like the movement from a more private
law approach to a more public law orientation, we can expect them to use their
power to counter it by, for instance, moving their emphasis from treaties to contracts
and by choosing commercial arbitral rules (e.g., ICC or UNCITRAL) rather than
specialized investment ones (e.g., ICSID). Second, advocates and arbitrators who
can happily inhabit the world of investment treaty and commercial arbitration will
continue to emphasize the similarities between these felds, but may also be happy
to see some investment treaty cases repackaged as commercial ones, as this plays to
their comparative advantage.192

A. TOWARDS AN ISDS REFORM

In 2018, the UNCITRAL Working Group III (UWGIII) invited states to submit
proposals to reform the procedural framework of ISDS.193 In response, states
submitted reform proposals that primarily address the ISDS legitimacy crisis I
discussed in Part I of this article, above. Te proposals include issues relating to
the independence and neutrality of arbitrators, consistent and coherent arbitral
191. Ibrahim FI Shihata, “Obstacles Facing International Arbitration” (1986) 4 Intl Tax & Bus
Lawyer 209 at 209. See also Guillaume Aréou, “Expected Challenges and Opportunities
of Investment Arbitration in Africa” (7 February 2019), online (blog): Kluwer Arbitration
<http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/02/07/expected-challenges-andopportunities-of-investment-arbitration-in-africa/> [https://perma.cc/5VVT-8PD3].
192. Anthea Roberts, “DIVERGENCE BETWEEN INVESTMENT AND COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION” (2012) 106 Am Soc’y Intl L Proc 297 at 300.
193. Te UWGIII was entrusted with a three-pronged mandate: “(i) to identify and consider
concerns regarding ISDS; (ii) to consider whether reform was desirable in light of any
identifed concerns; and (iii) if the Working Group were to conclude that reform was
desirable, to develop any relevant solutions to be recommended to the Commission.” See
Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UN, 50th Sess, UN Doc
A/72/17 (2017) at para 264. See also Lorenzo Cotula & Brooke Guven, “Investor-state
arbitration: an opportunity for real reform?” (7 December 2018) online (blog): International
Institute for Environment and Development <www.iied.org/investor-state-arbitrationopportunity-for-real-reform> [perma.cc/53ZN-GAEE].
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decisions, an efcient appeal system, exhaustion of local remedies, third-party
funding, and transparency of arbitral proceedings.194 Also, some states proposed
local community participation in ISA proceedings. For example, Indonesia
proposed that relevant stakeholders, private and public, representing business
and non-business interests alike, should be included in ISA proceedings.195
Indonesia argued that allowing local communities to participate in ISA
proceedings will balance the rights and obligations of all stakeholders. Similarly,
the European Union and its member states proposed that third parties, for
example, representatives of communities afected by investment disputes, should
be permitted to participate in ISA proceedings.196 Also, Ecuador proposed that
local communities should participate in ISA proceedings.197 However, Ecuador
noted that local community participation should be subject to the parties’ and
tribunals’ consent.198 Te proposals on accommodating third-party interests in
ISA proceedings show that some states are willing to support local community
participation.199
Te UWGIII considered the proposals in its 37th Session in April 2019
and admitted that third-party participation in ISA proceedings will allow ISA
tribunals to consider and hear relevant issues relating to the environment and
protection of human rights.200 In its deliberations, the working group considered
the UNCITRAL Rules and the United Nations Convention on Transparency in

194. “Working Group III: Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform” online: United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law <uncitral.un.org/en/working_groups/3/
investor-state> [perma.cc/U789-DSJX].
195. Possible reform of Investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS): Comments by the Government
of Indonesia, UNCITRAL WGIII, 37th Sess, UN Doc A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.156
(2018) at para 7.
196. See Possible reform of investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS): Submission from the
European Union and its Member States, UNCITRAL WGIII, 37th Sess, UN Doc A/CN.9/
WG.III/WP.159/Add.1 (2019) at paras 28-29.
197. See UNCITRAL Working Group III, Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement
(ISDS): Submission from the Government of Ecuador, UN Doc A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.175
(17 July 2019), at para 24, online: <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/
V19/072/09/PDF/V1907209.pdf?OpenElement>.
198. Ibid at para 25.
199. Ibid at para 26.
200. UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) on
the Work of its Tirty-Seventh Session (1–5 April 2019), UN Doc A/CN.9/970, online:
<https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V19/024/04/PDF/V1902404.
pdf?OpenElement> at para 18 [UNCITRAL, Working Group III].
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Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (“Mauritius Convention on Transparency”).201
Te UWGIII noted that these instruments provide an insufcient framework to
allow local community participation in ISA proceedings.202 Tis conclusion may
not be unconnected with the fact that the instruments only allow third parties to
fle written submissions without an opportunity for oral evidence.203 Although
the reform options for third-party participation in ISA proceedings are still being
considered by the UWGIII,204 the ongoing deliberation shows the possibility of
giving local communities access to ISA proceedings through an ISDS reform.
Tis article does not answer the question of how local communities can
participate in ISA proceedings. However, the Columbia Center on Sustainable
Investment (CCSI), International Institute for Environment and Development
(IIED), and International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD),
in their submission to the UWGIII, examine the reform options for third-party
participation.205 Similarly, the UN Working Group on the issue of human rights
and transnational corporations and other business enterprises also reiterated the
need for local communities to access justice in ISA proceedings.206 Although the
UN working group proposed a systemic reform that allows parties to incorporate
provisions of the UNGPs into IIAs, they note that “[i]f the ISDS system is to
maintain its legitimacy, it is imperative that afected communities and individuals

201. See UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 98. Article 4 provides that “[a]fter consultation with the
disputing parties, the arbitral tribunal may allow a person that is not a disputing party,
and not a non-disputing Party to the treaty (“third person(s)”), to fle a written submission
with the arbitral tribunal regarding a matter within the scope of the dispute.” See also
United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor State Arbitration,
online: <https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/fles/media-documents/uncitral/en/
transparency-convention-e.pdf> [https://perma.cc/2H7A-9HPX].
202. UNCITRAL, Working Group III, supra note 200.
203. Ibid.
204. Te 43rd UWGIII session is slated to hold in Vienna on 5-16 September 2022. See Working
Group III: Investor -State Dispute Settlement Reform, online: < https://uncitral.un.org/en/
working_groups/3/investor-state>.
205. See Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, International Institute for Environment
and Development, and International Institute for Sustainable Development, Tird Party
Rights in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Options for Reform, (15 July 2019), online:
UNCITRAL <https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/fles/media-documents/uncitral/
en/wgiii_reformoptions_0.pdf> [https://perma.cc/AZ7C-WJZR].
206. See Letter from independent human rights experts appointed by the UN Human Rights
Council, REF OL ARM 1/2019 (7 March 2019), online: <https://uncitral.un.org/sites/
uncitral.un.org/fles/public_-_ol_arm_07.03.19_1.2019_0.pdf> [https://perma.cc/
C8Y3-CSC5] [“Letter REF OL ARM 1/2019”].
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as well as public interest organizations are able to efectively participate in the
ISDS proceedings and present their evidence, views and perspectives in full.”207
Considering the possibility of reforming ISDS to include local community
participation in ISA proceedings, it is important to ask whether there is a need for
BHR arbitration. Tis question is important in light of a possible fragmentation
of international law described above and some commentators’ conclusion that
“the BHR Arbitration Rules Project is not clearly and consistently focused on
the access-to-remedy problem it is attempting to solve,”208 and that “[t]he BHR
Arbitration Rules are not drafted from a rights holder-claimant’s perspective, and
indeed leave potential claimants unduly exposed to a system that can undermine
their rights.”209 Indeed, the BHR arbitration framework is fraught with practical
procedural difculties. Issues relating to preliminary proceedings, hearings, and
enforcement of awards refect these difculties. For example, as a preliminary
issue, it may be difcult to establish consent to arbitrate between MNCs and
local communities, especially in instances where parties did not submit to
arbitration in advance. Terefore, the tribunal’s jurisdiction may be challenged
on the ground that there was no consent to arbitrate between victims, local
communities, and MNCs.
Te procedural challenges are exacerbated by the overlapping issues of
private and public law in BHR arbitration.210 For example, during a hearing, the
tribunal’s jurisdiction to hear a claim may be challenged because BHR disputes
may be intertwined with tortious and criminal issues that may not be settled
by way of accord and compromise. It is even more complex when governments
are complicit in the tortious and criminal wrongs of MNCs; it raises the
question of whether states can or should be added to international arbitration
proceedings in such mixed (criminal and tortious) claims. Tese practical
difculties defy a straitjacket answer. Indeed, it has been noted that “areas of
confict between fundamental rights and arbitration…has been recognized by,
207. Ibid at 6.
208. Gustavo Becker, “Business and Human Rights Arbitration: A Potential Procedural
Remedy for Transnational Human Rights Litigation Involving European and Latin
Parties” (8 March 2021), online (blog): <https://eurolatinstudies.com/index.php/laces/
announcement/view/19>.
209. Lisa E Sachs, et al, “Te Business and Human Rights Arbitration Rule Project: Falling
Short of its Access to Justice Objectives” (September 2019), online: Columbia Center
on Sustainable Investment <https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1151&context=sustainable_investment_stafpubs> [https://perma.
cc/5R7K-KNWX] at 7.
210. See generally Youseph Farah, “Improving Accountability through the Contractualisation of
Human Rights” (2013) 2 Business and Human Rights Review 11.
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and is worrisome to, arbitrators, arbitration practitioners, constitutional lawyers
and foreign investors.”211
Te overlapping public and private law issues become more evident at
the enforcement stage with the application of the New York Convention. Since
one-third of countries who are signatories to the New York Convention limit its
application to only commercial matters, business and human rights claims may be
outside the scope of most national arbitral statutes.212 Terefore, it may be difcult
to enforce awards that are not classifed as commercial awards under the New York
Convention.213 Also, an award touching on states’ public regulatory powers (such
as human rights) may be unenforceable on the ground that such disputes are
not arbitrable, or are contrary to the public policy of the seat of arbitration.214
Although, Crockett and Sousa note that there are no reported cases where an
award was refused because it touches on human rights, the potential difculty of
arbitrability of such disputes exists, especially in arbitration proceedings where
the seat is in developing countries.215 Most developing countries, especially in
Africa, continue to restrict the scope of arbitral matters due to public policy and
sovereignty concerns.216
However, ISA is more suitable for local community claims because it is a
hybrid system that ofers an opportunity to achieve both private and public
interests in a single forum.217 Te combination of public and private law issues
211. Andrew I Chukwuemerie, “Arbitration and Human Rights in Africa” (2007) 7 Afr Hum
Rts LJ 103 at 104.
212. See Crockett & de Sousa, supra note 151 at 110.
213. Tis is notwithstanding Article 1(2) of the Draft Rules provision that “[t]he parties agree
that any dispute that is submitted to arbitration under these Rules shall be considered to
have arisen out of a commercial relationship or transaction for the purposes of Article I of
the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.”
It is submitted that parties cannot contract out of mandatory national statutes relating to
arbitrability—a fact acknowledged by Article 1(4) which provides that “[t]hese Rules shall
govern the arbitration except that where any of these Rules is in confict with a provision of
the law applicable to the arbitration from which the parties cannot derogate, that provision
shall prevail.”
214. See Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, “Te UNCITRAL Model Law: A Tird World
Viewpoint” (1989) 6 J Intl Arb 7 at 15.
215. See e.g. Loukas A Mistelis and Stavros L Brekoulakis, eds, Arbitrability: International &
Comparative Perspectives (Kluwer Law International, 2009) at 6.
216. See generally Akinwumi Ogunranti, “Separating the Wheat from the Chaf: Delimiting
Public Policy Infuence on the Arbitrability of Disputes in Africa” (2019) 10 J Sustainable
Dev L and Pol’y 105.
217. See José E Alvarez, “Is Investor-State Arbitration ‘Public’?” (2016) 7 J Intl Dispute
Settlement 534.
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that cause procedural challenges for BHR arbitration can be accommodated in
ISA proceedings. For example, public law issues, including public policy and
states’ policies on health, human rights, and the environment can be heard
together with private law issues involving the proprietary and contractual rights
of investors. Julie Maupin notes that “[i]nternational investment law deals with
both public and private concerns, impacts upon both public and private actors,
and crosses over traditional divides separating public law from private law and
public international law from private international law.”218 Terefore, allowing
third-party participation in a platform that is already designed as a hybrid system
will prevent some of the procedural challenges that BHR arbitration will face as
a forum that focuses only on commercial disputes.219
Furthermore, due to its reliance on the New York Convention, the Hague
Rules leave the enforcement of awards at the mercy of states. Abhisar Vidyarthi
agrees that “for awards rendered under the Hague Rules to hold any credibility,
the enforcement states must be readily willing to enforce them.”220 Terefore,
states’ legislation and policies on arbitrability of human rights and justiciability
of human rights claims against corporations will determine whether a BHR
arbitration award will be enforced. Apart from the fact that this situation breeds
unpredictability and inconsistencies in the enforcement of awards, it may also
create a situation where states frustrate the enforcement of awards that are
unfavourable to them.
On the other hand, enforcement of ISA awards does not depend on individual
states’ enforcement policies. Sections 53 and 54 of the ICSID Convention provide
that an ISA award is fnal and can be enforced in the court of any ICSID Member
State as though it were a fnal judgment of that state’s courts. In efect, an ISA
award is equivalent to a judgement of a state court that cannot be set aside by
another court except on limited grounds. Although enforcement of awards

218. Julie A Maupin, “Public and Private in International Investment Law: An Integrated Systems
Approach” (2014) 54 Va J Int L 367 at 367.
219. See Zachary Douglas, supra note 69. See also Farah, supra note 210 at 13.
220. Abhisar Vidyarthi, “Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights: What Lies Ahead?”
(September 2020), online (blog): Columbia Law School <http://aria.law.columbia.edu/
hague-rules-on-business-and-human-rights-arbitration-what-lies-ahead/>.

OGUNRANTI, BETWEEN THE DEVIL AND THE DEEP BLUE SEA 751

under the ICSID Convention is not perfect,221 it is less complex than the New
York Convention. Tis is because ICSID awards can only be refused on limited
grounds,222 and are not subject to national courts’ discretion.223 Terefore, apart
from confrming the signature of the Secretary-General, national courts play a
limited role in the enforcement of an ICSID award.224 It has been noted that
“[i]n terms of enforcing an award, ICSID arbitration is probably preferable for
investors.”225 So, if the ICSID enforcement mechanism is preferable for investors,
victims of business and human rights abuse should also be able to enjoy the same
robust enforcement mechanism.
In terms of remedies, an ISA tribunal can provide similar remedies to the
ones provided by BHR arbitration. Indeed, this is one of the recommendations
of the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights in its report to the
UWGIII.226 Te UN Working Group noted that ISDS reform should take an
“all roads lead to remedy” approach which will enable local communities to
seek remedies in ISA proceedings through a reconfgured IIA or treaty that
recognizes the human rights obligations of investors.227 Tis recommendation
may not be unconnected with the fact that ISA tribunals can order both
pecuniary and non-pecuniary remedies as recommended in Principle 25 of the

221. See Christopher Smith, “Te Appeal of ICSID Awards: How the AMINZ Appellate
Mechanism Can Guide Reform of ICSID Procedure” (2013) 41 Ga J Intl & Comp L
567. See also Matthew H Kirtland, Katie Connolly & Jacob Smit, “A Comparison of
the Enforcement Regimes under the New York and Washington Conventions” (2018)
online: Norton Rose Fulbright <https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/
publications/04f14b2a/a-comparison-of-the-enforcement-regimes-under-the-new-york-andwashington-conventions-mdashbra-tale-of-two-cities> [https://perma.cc/L957-6S6M] at 4.
222. By way of revision or interpretation of an award. However, either party can also request an
annulment of an award through an independent ad-hoc panel. See International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes, “ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules”
(Washington, 2006) at arts 50-52.
223. Tey are enforced in contracting states as fnal judgments. See ibid at art 54(1).
224. See Amazu A Asouzu, “African States and the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards: Some Key
Issues” (1999) 15 Arb Intl 1 at 28.
225. Wick, supra note 80 at 279.
226. See Letter REF OL ARM 1/2019, supra note 206.
227. Ibid. See also Nicholas J Diamond & Kabir AN Duggal, “Adding New Ingredients to an Old
Recipe: Do ISDS Reforms and New Investment Treaties Support Human Rights?” (2021) 53
Case W Res J Intl L 117.
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Guiding Principles.228 For example, like BHR arbitral tribunals, ISA tribunals
can order remedies, including apologies, restitution, rehabilitation, fnancial or
non-fnancial compensation and punitive sanctions, as well as the prevention
of harm through, for example, injunctions or guarantees of non-repetition.229
In sum, if local communities are granted access to ISA proceedings, they can get
remedies similar to those provided by a BHR arbitration tribunal.
If history is anything to go by, the Hague Rules may sufer from low reception
from parties and MNCs.230 Te Hague Rules may follow the path of the PCA
Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Natural Resources and/or
the Environment (“PCA Rules”).231 Like the Hague Rules, the PCA Rules were
drafted by a working group and committee of experts in environmental law and
arbitration to address the principal gaps in environmental dispute resolution.
Also, like the Hague Rules, the PCA Rules are based on the UNCITRAL Rules,
and they allow arbitration between any combination of states, intergovernmental
organizations, and non-governmental organizations, MNCs, and individuals.
However, the PCA Rules had a lukewarm reception in 2001 and were scarcely
adopted by parties.232 As of 2016, only six cases were commenced under the PCA

228. Commentary to Principle 25 of the Guiding Principles provides that “[r]emedy may include
apologies, restitution, rehabilitation, fnancial or non-fnancial compensation and punitive
sanctions (whether criminal or administrative, such as fnes), as well as the prevention
of harm through, for example, injunctions or guarantees of non-repetition.” On the
power of ISA tribunals to make nonpecuniary orders, see generally Christoph Schereuer,
“Non-Pecuniary Remedies in ICSID Arbitration” (2004) 20 Arb Intl 325; Patrick J
Rodriguez, “International Contractualism Revisited: Non-Pecuniary Remedies under the Fair
and Equitable Treatment Standard” (2018) 18 Chicago J Intl L 673. See also Antoine Goetz
and others v Republic of Burundi I, ICSID Case No ARB/95/3 (where, in an interim award,
the tribunal gave the sovereign a choice of non-pecuniary relief or pecuniary obligation,
holding that Burundi can either “give an adequate and efective indemnity to the claimants”
or “return the benefts of the free zone to them”). See also Steven K Davidson & Michael
J Baratz, “Enforcing Non-pecuniary Obligations in an ICSID Award” (3 August 2021),
online (blog): <https://www.steptoe.com/en/news-publications/enforcing-non-pecuniaryobligations-in-an-icsid-award.html> [https://perma.cc/QTC4-ZYXA].
229. See Tomoko Ishikawa, “Restitution as a ‘Second Chance’ for Investor-State Relations:
Restitution and Monetary Damages as Sequential Options” (2016) 3 McGill J
Disp Resol 154.
230. See Iris Ng Li Shan, “On the Path to Justice: Exploring the Promise and Pitfalls Of the
Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration” (2020) 2 ITA in Rev 54 at 58.
231. Permanent Court of Arbitration, online: <https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/01/
Optional-Rules-for-Arbitration-of-Disputes-Relating-to-the-Environment-and_
or-Natural-Resources.pdf> [https://perma.cc/9AXX-53Y9].
232. See Li Shan, supra note 230 at 58.
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Rules.233 Considering the similarities in the making of the two Rules, the Hague
Rules may sufer the same challenges as the PCA Rules because, as of July 2021,
the Hague Rules have not been used by any party.234
Conversely, notwithstanding its critics, ISA has existed since the nineteenth
century and has enjoyed remarkable and steady growth from a few infrequent
cases to more than forty new cases each year.235 Indeed, it has been noted that
“[n]otwithstanding the criticism…ISA remains the most common dispute
resolution mechanism adopted in BITs.”236 Admittedly, ISA presently sufers
from a legitimacy crisis as I described in Part I of this article, but the current
ISDS reform process ofers an opportunity to solve some of the procedural
challenges. In efect, the history of the ICSID Convention and its acceptance over
time prevents (or mitigates) a legitimacy attack that a new arbitral rule would
ordinarily be subjected to.237
Apart from the comparative advantages of ISA over BHR arbitration,
an ISDS reform that allows local community participation in ISA proceedings
has its advantages. First, it will ameliorate, if not eliminate, access to justice
problems associated with ISA proceedings as discussed in Parts I and II of this
article.238 Second, recognizing local communities’ standing in ISA proceedings
will promote ISA as a just, fair, and equitable system for both investors and host
states.239 Tis is because the reform will balance the interests of both investors and

233. In half the cases, both parties were private entities, while the other three cases involved
a public limited company, a public-owned private company, or a government agency as
respondent. See Tamar Meshel, “Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to
Natural Resources and/or the Environment: Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)” in Max
Planck Encyclopedias of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2016), online: <https://
pure.mpg.de/rest/items/item_3196242_1/component/fle_3196243/content> [https://
perma.cc/KT3D-MYKV].
234. See Florencia Villaggi & Benjamin Guthrie, “Arbitration, Business, and Human Rights”
(14 July 2021), online: Corporate Counsel Business Journal <ccbjournal.com/articles/
arbitration-business-and-human-rights> [perma.cc/A562-F5K9].
235. See William W Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, “Private Litigation in a Public
Law Sphere: Te Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations” (2010) 35 Yale J
Intl L 283 at 284.
236. Blythe, supra note 59 at 277.
237. Although Ecuador and Bolivia have exited the IIA completely, with South Africa also exiting,
a vast majority of countries still sign bilateral treaties. Terefore, a reform may be a way to
reduce the ICSID legitimacy crisis. See Choudhury, supra note 122 at 477.
238. See Laryea, supra note 8 at 2866.
239. Ibid.
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host states, which are presently lopsided in favour of investors.240 Tird, reforming
ISDS to include local community participation will allow them to enjoy benefts
from new-generation BITs and IIAs that reference corporate responsibility and
business and human rights guidance tools.241 Tis is because local communities
can claim a breach of MNCs’ human rights obligations in BITs or IIAs in ISA
proceedings. In efect, investors will be held accountable for their human rights
and environmental abuse in the same forum that protects them.242 MNCs will no
longer be untouchable in ISA proceedings because local communities and host
states will be able to claim and counterclaim against them.243
Furthermore, allowing local communities to participate in ISA proceedings
may be one of the solutions to the social confict that comes with some of
the investment projects discussed in Parts I and II, above.244 Recognizing the
rights of local communities in ISA proceedings means that local communities
have access to an independent forum where they can fle claims about human
rights and environmental abuse. Since host states may sometimes be complicit
in human rights abuses, local communities that may be reluctant to approach
domestic courts may access ISA. Terefore, instead of resorting to self-help that
may lead to social confict and violence, the intervention of local communities
before an ISA tribunal may be a catalyst for a full-blown ISA proceeding where
the investment-related issues of investors, host states, and local communities are
heard together.
In sum, it is more efcient to reform the ISDS regime than to create a new
BHR arbitration system that is untested and fraught with procedural challenges of

240. Ibid. See also Lorenzo Cotula & Terrence Neal, “UNCITRAL Working Group III: Can
Reforming Procedures Rebalance Investors Rights and Obligations?” (March 2019)
online (pdf ): Te South Center <www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/
IPB15_UNCITRAL-Working-Group-III-Can-Reforming-Procedures-Rebalance-InvestorRights-and-Obligations_EN-1.pdf> [perma.cc/E2YG-B5PJ].
241. See Lorenzo Cotula, “Business and human rights in investment treaties: What
progress? (11 November 2011), online (pdf ): <eprints.lse.ac.uk/82107/1/
UN%20FORUM%20SERIES%20-%20Business%20and%20human%20rights%20in%20
investment%20treaties_%20What%20progress_.pdf> [perma.cc/WCG2-4R9A].
242. Ibid.
243. See Lorenzo Cotula & Nicolas M Perrone, “Reforming Investor-state Dispute Settlement:
What about Tird-party Rights” (February 2019), online (pdf ): International Institute for
Environment and Development <pubs.iied.org/sites/default/fles/pdfs/migrate/17638IIED.
pdf> [perma.cc/E9JS-PCN8].
244. See Laryea, supra note 8 at 2866.

OGUNRANTI, BETWEEN THE DEVIL AND THE DEEP BLUE SEA 755

its own.245 Experts, scholars, and stakeholders must not relent on eforts to review
the investment law structure to create an inclusive ISA that refects the relational
interaction between investment, human rights, environment, and sustainability.
Central to this proposed ISA framework is equal access to justice for investors,
host states, and victims and local communities harmed by investment activities.246
However, as attractive as this proposal may seem, it would be naïve to suggest
that it is without its own challenges. Indeed, Odumosu notes that ISDS reform
in this regard is a “Herculean” and “arduous” task.247 Te next section examines
some of these challenges.

V. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS AND CHALLENGES TO
ISDS REFORM
It may be difcult to implement an inclusive ISDS reform partly because of
ISA’s traditional role as an interpretative and dispute settlement mechanism, and
because of the politico-economic considerations involved in BIT negotiations.
I classify these challenges as procedural and politico-economic challenges,
respectively. It is important to acknowledge that the extent of ISDS reform will
depend on the political and legal will of stakeholders in international investment
law. Terefore, the analysis in this section refects a politico-economic dimension
to law reform. Tis section argues that although the investment regime is driven
by political and economic concerns, there may be a legal response to it. I respond
to some of these objections, but this discussion is by no means exhaustive due to
the limited space in this article.

245. For further challenges of BHR arbitration, see Cismas & Macrory, supra note 151 at 224;
Yiannibas, supra note 151 at 214; Crockett & de Sousa, supra note 151 at 104; Center for
International Legal Cooperation, supra note 132. See also International Law Association
Study Group on Business and Human Rights (Draft Final Report, 23 July 2019) at 8-9.
246. See Odumosu, “Locating Tird World Resistance,” supra note 14 at 436. Odumosu notes:
[O]f course, the point is not that regulatory measures adopted in response to domestic pressure
should automatically trump investment protection, rather, the suggestion is that in view of
the increased incidence of cases where domestic pressure is pleaded as (one of ) the factor(s)
that triggered the adoption of legal rules, there is a dire need for the development of an
international investment regime that engages Tird World resistance and acknowledges that
just as it (investment dispute settlement) shapes peoples’ lives, domestic resistance also shapes
and informs its realm.
247. Ibid at 437.
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A. PROCEDURAL CHALLENGES

Arguably, an ISDS reform is too remote a solution to problems arising from
BITs that are unevenly negotiated.248 ISA is an interpretative institution that
determines parties’ treaty obligations, which were agreed upon by states and
investors. Since (developing) states, most of whom may be ill-advised to sign
BITs, enter BITs freely, any proposed reform must focus on the treaty-signing
stage instead of ISDS’s procedural reform.249 Tis is because ISA derives its
jurisdiction from BITs that may not permit the inclusive dispute resolution
structure that this article proposes.250 For example, it will be difcult to argue for
inclusive participation where the scope of a BIT excludes investors’ human rights,
environmental obligations, and community participation. Indeed, Trakman
notes that “[ISA] is not an end in itself, nor should it be so construed.”251
Tis argument is valid and legitimate. However, as stated in the previous
section, the tides in investment treaty signing are changing; there is an increasing
reference to CSR and business and human rights guidance tools in investment
treaties.252 For example, the 2018 Dutch model BIT incorporates the Guiding

248. See Hisham Ababneh, A MODEL BIT FOR DEVELOPMENT: Te Example of Jordan
(SJD Tesis, University of Pittsburg School of Law, 2017) [unpublished] at 311 (“[t]
he solution to the current state-of-afairs is not one related to the ISDS process itself, but
rather is related to the broad and unqualifed provisions of BITs”); Indeed, it has been noted
that “…developing countries generally have less bargaining power and might be subject to
unfavorable liability provisions in bilateral or multilateral investment treaties designed by the
capital and technology exporting states.” See Hanson Hosein, “UNSETTLING: Bhopal and
the Resolution of International Disputes Involving an Environmental Disaster” (1993) 16
Boston College Intl & Comp L Rev 285 at 309.
249. See e.g., Howard Mann, “RECONCEPTUALIZING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW: ITS ROLE IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT” (2013) 17 Lewis &
Clark L Rev 521.
250. However, the case of Urbasersa v Argentina suggests that the Tribunal could rely on “external”
sources of law, which include international human rights instruments to enforce human
rights obligations in BITs. See Patrick Abe, “Counterclaims Based on International Human
Rights Obligations of Investors in International Investment Arbitration: Fallacies and
Potentials of the 2016 ICSID Urbaser v. Argentina Award” (2018) 1 Brill Open L 61.
251. Trakman, supra note 27 at 605.
252. See Lorenzo Cotula, “Business and Human Rights in Investment Treaties: What Progress?”
(11 November 2015), online (blog): London School of Economics: UN Forum Series
<https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businesshumanrights/2015/11/11/un-forum-series-business-andhuman-rights-in-investment-treaties-what-progress/> [https://perma.cc/753V-DFF3].
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Principles and OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.253 It urges tribunals
to consider investors’ non-compliance with their commitments under these
guidance tools. Similar model treaties, which include the 2012 South-African
Development Community (SADC) Model BIT, 2015 Norway Model BIT,254
2016 Nigerian-Morocco BIT,255 ECOWAS Common Investment Code,256
and the Supplementary Act A/SA.3/12/08 Adopting Community Rules on
Investment and the Modalities for their Implementation with ECOWAS,257
suggest that there is a growing new generation of investment treaties that support
a human rights approach.258 Terefore, there is a need to reform ISDS to support
253. Article 23 of the Model BIT specifcally provides that “[w]ithout prejudice to national
administrative or criminal law procedures, a Tribunal may, in deciding on the amount of
compensation [to award to an investor following a breach of the BIT by the host State],
take into account non-compliance by the investor with its commitments under the UN
Guiding Principles on Businesses and Human Rights, and the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises.” Antony Crockett, “Going Dutch—A Model for Rebalancing
Investment Treaties to Address Human Rights Concerns?” (24 May 2018), online
(blog): Herbert Smith Freehills <https://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/latest-thinking/
going-dutch-%E2%80%93-a-model-for-rebalancing-investment-treaties-to-address-humanrights> [https://perma.cc/SS4C-L7F4].
254. Article 31 provides that “[t]he Parties agree to encourage investors to conduct their
investment activities in compliance with the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and to
participate in the United Nations Global Compact.” Draft Version 130515, online:
<https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/e47326b61f424d4c9c3d470896492623/
draft-model-agreement-english.pdf>.
255. See Tarcisio Gazzini, “Te 2016 Morocco–Nigeria BIT: An Important Contribution to the
Reform of Investment Treaties” (2017) 3 Investment Treaty News Q 3.
256. (ECOWIC) (July 2018), online: West Africa Competitiveness Programme <https://wacomp.
projects.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/ECOWAS-COMMON-INVESTMENTCODEENGLISH.pdf> [https://perma.cc/535D-58UQ].
257. UNCTAD, (19 December 2008), online: <https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/
international-investment-agreements/treaty-fles/3266/download> [https://perma.
cc/KLD9-XQ9P].
258. Article 15(1) of the SADC Model BIT states:
Investors and their investments have a duty to respect human rights in the workplace and in
the community and State in which they are located. Investors and their investments shall not
undertake or cause to be undertaken acts that breach such human rights. Investors and their
investments shall not assist in, or be complicit in, the violation of the [sic] human rights by
others in the Host State, including by public authorities or during civil strife.” Also, Article
18(2) of the Morocco-Nigeria BIT similarly provides that “[i]nvestors and investments shall
uphold human rights in the host state.

Naomi Brierclife & Olga Owczarek, “Human-Rights-Based Claims by States and ‘New
Generation’ International Investment Agreements” (1 August 2018), online (blog): Kluwer
Arbitration <http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/08/01/human-rights-basedclaims-by-states-and-new-generation-international-investment-agreements/> [https://perma.
cc/A5BN-GC2L].
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rights and obligations fowing from this new generation of BITs. Human rights
obligations arising from BITs should be supported by local community access to
ISA proceedings. Tis way, local communities can directly claim rights included
in BITs for their beneft.
On contractual grounds, the doctrine of privity of contract may pose a
challenge to an inclusive ISA proceeding. If, technically, states are parties to
investment treaties, and states and investors are parties to investment contracts,
it is arguable that local communities do not have locus standi to make claims in ISA
proceedings. However, this challenge can be overcome if we cease to view states as
abstract entities and construe them as representatives of local communities. In this
view, states play an agency or trusteeship role in relation to local communities.259
A clause in the contract or treaty that provides that a state signs the BIT for itself
and on behalf of its citizens may clarify the relationship between states and local
communities as trustees and benefciaries, respectively.260 Laryea proposes that
one way to incorporate third-party benefts on local communities is to include
a clause in the IIA or treaty stating that the host state is acting on behalf of its
citizens.261 I agree with this proposal. Te Hague Rules provide a model clause
that refects the proposal in this article as follows:
Te parties irrevocably consent that any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of
or in relation to: [insert defned subject matter, which may include:
(a) selected national laws;
(b) selected international instruments;
(c) other industry or supply chain codes of conduct, statutory
commitments or regulations from sports governing bodies, or any
other relevant business and human rights norms or instruments]
may be submitted by any third party benefciary of such [law(s)]
[instrument(s)] to arbitration in accordance with the Hague Rules on
Business and Human Rights Arbitration.262

It has been noted that the above model clause “provides an elegant and
relatively fuss-free way of opening the door to arbitration for alleged victims.”263
A BIT or IIA clause that incorporates the above model clause will allow local
259. See Eyal Benvenisti, “Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to
Foreign Stakeholders” (2013) 107 Am J Intl L 295 at 296.
260. See Laryea, supra note 8 at 2872.
261. Ibid at 2871-2872.
262. Simma, “Hague Rules,” supra note 134 at 106-107.
263. Li Shan, supra note 230 at 62.
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communities to participate in ISA proceedings and, consequently, overcome the
privity challenge.264
However, it may be difcult to obtain investors’ advance consent to local
community claims of human rights and environmental protection abuse. Tis
is because consent to such an agreement may open investors to a barrage of
claims, which may jeopardize their business activities and stability in host states.
Although Laryea suggests ways to establish investors’ consent,265 their feasibility
remains doubtful because they involve legal and political considerations. However,
if investors, who are reluctant to consent to local community participation in
ISA, are now considering the prospect of consenting to BHR arbitration,266
it is an indication that obtaining investors’ consent may be a difcult task—but
not an impossible one.267
In sum, procedural challenges to an inclusive ISDS reform may arise
from the nature of BITs as contracts between two consenting parties and the
ISA as an interpretative tool of these established rights.268 Terefore, ISDS
reform involves recalibrating parties’ rights in BITs and ISA proceedings to
recognize local communities’ formal participatory rights. Tese are some of
264. See Choudhury, supra note 122 at 463-75. Choudhury notes that there are a number of
avenues through which human rights obligations can be incorporated into IIAs. Tey include
use of preambles or objectives, substantive obligations, human rights chapters, and alternative
remedies (negotiation and consultation).
265. Laryea, supra note 8 at 2869. Laryea notes:
Tere are several ways by which an investor’s consent to arbitrate may be obtained. Tese
include: (1) ad hoc, case by case, consent (i.e., giving consent when requested by an HSC after
a dispute has arisen); (2) voluntarily making a standing ofer of consent to all HSCs, which
may be accepted by the act of initiating arbitral proceedings; (3) making a standing ofer of
consent to all HSCs in an investment contract between the investor and the host state, if there
was such a contract; (4) a declaration in the host state’s law that all foreign investors are deemed
to have consented to arbitration initiated by HSCs; and (5) a declaration in a mandatory
domestic licensing or authorization regime for foreign investors and investments stating that
they have consented to arbitration proceedings initiated by HSCs.

266. See Cismas & Macrory, supra note 151 at 224; Yiannibas, supra note 151 at 214; Crockett &
Sousa, supra note 151 at 104.
267. It may be argued that investors who are truly committed to corporate social responsibility
may be open to consent to an investment arbitration as a form of corporate accountability.
However, this approach may not be appealing to some MNCs that exploit most developing
countries’ weak domestic legal systems and wide unaccountability.
268. It is acknowledged that ISA also performs substantive roles in the shaping of the ICSID
regime because these proceedings determine whether states are liable and assess damages,
sometimes in the billions of dollars. Tese decisions have contributed substantially to the
legitimacy concerns regarding IIAs.

760

(2022) 59 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

the issues that the UNCITRAL Working Group will (hopefully) address in the
ongoing ISDS reform.
B. POLITICO-ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

Te term “politico-economy” is used broadly in this article. Tis term refers
to the political and economic interests of widely acclaimed stakeholders in the
investment regime—investors, home states, and arbitrators.269 One of the reasons
for establishing an investment regime is to depoliticize and transfer investment
disputes from the realm of diplomacy and politics to the realm of law.270
It has been noted that “[t]he essence of each of these arrangements [the ICSID
Convention, BITs] is that controversies between foreign investors and host
states are insulated from political and diplomatic relations between states.”271
In essence, the purpose of the depoliticization theory in investment law is to
resolve investment disputes without creating a state-state confict.
However, regardless of the depoliticization theory, international investment
law is a tool to advance modern global capitalism.272 Tis is because developed
countries enter into treaty negotiations to protect their economic and political
interests through MNCs.273 For example, it has been noted that “American
investment treaties were used primarily for the protection of American capital
and cementing diplomatic relations with politically important countries.”274 Te
investment regime is an opportunity for MNCs and developed home countries to
execute a neoliberal global agenda that reduces (developing) states’ intervention in
the economy and promotes global laissez-faire capitalism.275 Terefore, although
269. Kidane refers to investors and arbitrators as the two most important players. See Kidane
supra note 52 at 579. Tis section focuses on these two.
270. See Aron Broches, “Settlement of Investment Disputes” in Aron Broches, Selected Essays:
World Bank, ICSID and Other Subjects of Public and Private International Law (Martinus
Nijhof Publishers, 1995) 161 at 163. Te depoliticization theory is grounded in Article
27(1) and (2) of the ICSID Convention which provides that a state shall not give diplomatic
protection to its nationals in cases where parties agree to submit the dispute to an
arbitration panel.
271. Andreas F Lowenfeld, Separate Opinion on the Award in Corn Products International, Inc.
v United Mexican States, (18 August 2009) ICSID Case no ARB(AF)/04/1, at para 1.
272. See generally St John, supra note 42.
273. See generally Milan Babic, Jan Fichtner & Eelke M Heemskerk, “States Versus Corporations:
Rethinking the Power of Business in International Politics” (2017) 52 Intl Spectator 20.
274. Lauge N Skovgaard Poulsen, “Te Politics of Investment Treaty Arbitration” in Tomas
Schultz & Federico Ortino, Te Oxford Handbook of International Arbitration (Oxford
University Press, 2020) 740 at 747.
275. See David Kotz, “Globalization and Neoliberalism” (2002) 12 Rethinking Marxism 64.
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international investment law may have been purposively created to reduce the
infuence of state diplomacy and politics, it has created an avenue for some states
to secure their economic interests in developing countries.
Owing to the developed nations and MNCs’ powerful and joint
politico-economic interests in the investment regime, it may be difcult to
change the regime’s liberal economic approach to an inclusive structure that
equally distributes rights and obligations between host states, investors, and local
communities. In efect, incorporating BHR arbitration elements that are focused
on corporate accountability and remedy may be antithetical to the founding
political and economic interests of international investment law.276 Terefore, the
proposed ISDS reform is incongruous with the history of BITs and ISA, which
are meant only to protect investors’ business in host states.277
However, the changing global political economy of the investment regime
suggests that advocates of investment protection may be open to a reform that
refects investors’ obligations in BITs and an inclusive ISA.278 With the rise of
emerging markets as capital exporters, the power dynamics are changing in the
global economic order.279 Developed countries are now capital importers and are
increasingly subjected to investment claims from investors in emerging markets.280
Terefore, the surge in investment claims arising from the North American Free

276. See Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, Te International Law on Foreign Investment, 2nd
(Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 5. Sornarajah notes that “[t]he interplay of various
economic, political and historical factors shaped and continues to shape and continues to
shape the development of international law on foreign investment.”.
277. See Perrone, “Invisible Local Communities,” supra note 16 at 21. See also Jorge Daniel
Taillant & Jonathan Bonnitcha, “International Investment Law and Human Rights” in
Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Markus W Gehring & Andrew Paul Newcombe, eds,
Sustainable Development in World Investment Law (Kluwer Law International, 2011) 53 at 59.
Taillant and Bonnitcha note that “[t]he public interest in terms of the social, environmental,
or economic negative externalities of large foreign investments, was simply not part of the
objectives pursued in the evolution of...[the] investment legal framework”.
278. See Bonnitcha, Poulsen & Waibel, supra note 7 at 233.
279. Ibid at 202-205. China is an example of countries that is increasingly becoming a capital
exporter. See e.g. Trakman, supra note 27 at 624. Similarly, developing countries continue
to enter into BITs with one another. Tis means that the narrative between developing and
developed countries are changing.
280. See UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2004: Te Shift Towards Services (2004) at 19.
UNCTAD noted that “outward FDI from developing countries is becoming important.” See
also Rainer Geiger, “Multilateral Approaches to Investment: Te Way Forward” in José E
Alvarez, Karl P Sauvant et al, eds, Te Evolving International Investment Regime: Expectations,
Realities, Options (Oxford University Press, 2011) 153 at 155.
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Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and other multilateral trade agreements may lead
traditional advocates for investment protection to consider an inclusive policy.281
Indeed, the rise of emerging economies, including Brazil, Russia, India, and
China (BRICS), changes the nature of global investment fows and ultimately
challenges the existing investment law’s political and institutional structure.282
It has been noted that, “as outward foreign investment from ‘developing’
countries such as China expands, the reciprocity of the investment regime is
no longer a legal fction, and the traditional developed/developing country is
becoming less useful in explaining attitudes and policies towards investment in
diferent states.”283 Tis statement requires little clarifcation to show the extent
of ongoing global developments. Te emerging economies are not only sources
of outward FDI; they are also recipients of foreign investments—they act as
home states and host states simultaneously.284 In sum, emerging economies are
no longer “rule-takers”; they are now “rule-makers.”285 Terefore, developed
countries’ reduced hegemony or monopoly over foreign investment presents an
opportunity to reframe the international investment law framework.286
Even if developed states accept an inclusive structure as I argue in this
article, it is doubtful whether arbitrators will welcome ISA’s inclusive approach
281. See Wenhua Shan, “From North-South Divide to Private-Public Debate: Revival of the
Calvo Doctrine and the Changing Landscape in International Investment Law” (2007) 27
Nw J Intl L & Bus 631 at 650 (noting that “[m]ounting cases against the U.S. government
before…[NAFTA] tribunals, has put the United States, a long-time unreserved advocate
of investment liberalism, on defense, and forced it to re-examine investment treaties and
treaty-based arbitration for the frst time in history from a defendant’s position”).
282. See Anthea Roberts, “Investment Treaties: Te Reform Matrix” (2018) 112 AJIL 191; Karl P
Sauvant, Geraldine McAllister with Wolfgang Maschek, eds, Foreign Direct Investment from
Emerging Markets: Te Challenges Ahead (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) at 3; Stephan W Schill,
“Tearing down the Great Wall - Te New Generation Investment Treaties of the People’s
Republic of China” (2007) 15 Cardozo J Intl & Comp L 73.
283. Bonnitcha, Poulsen & Waibel, supra note 7 at 230.
284. See Fabio Bertoni, Stefano Elia & Larissa Rabbiosi, “Outward FDI from the BRICs: Trends
and Patterns of Acquisitions in Advanced Countries” in Marin Marinov & Svetla Marinova,
eds, Emerging Economies and Firms in the Global Crisis (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) 47; John
Matthews, “Dragon Multinationals: New Players in 21st Century Globalization” (2006) 23
Asia Pacifc J Management 5.
285. Karl Sauvant, “Emerging Markets and the International Investment Law and Policy Regime”
in Robert Grosse & Klaus E Meyer, eds, Te Oxford Handbook of Management in Emerging
Markets (Oxford University Press, 2019) 127 at 151.
286. Indeed, it has been noted that “[t]he United States and Europe can no longer assume that
they have the political and economic power to set the rules of the game.” Sonia E Rolland,
“Te BRICS’ Contributions to the Architecture and Norms of International Economic Law”
(2013) 107 Am Soc’y Intl L Proc 164 at 169.

OGUNRANTI, BETWEEN THE DEVIL AND THE DEEP BLUE SEA 763

that focuses on investors’ obligations. Tis is because investment arbitrators
are often criticized for systematically valuing investors’ interests above the host
state or local community interests.287 Although this criticism may be anecdotal,
this does not foreclose the possibility of systemic bias.288 Some arbitrators may
be biased towards investors due to their policy preference and background as
commercial lawyers.289 Tey may also favour investors’ interests to increase their
business opportunities (as counsel or arbitrator) for future investment disputes
because MNCs are repeat players.290 In fact, “[m]any arbitrators vocally rejected
a proposal by International Court of Justice Judge, Bruno Simma, to give greater
consideration to international environmental and human rights law in investment
arbitration.”291 Tis statement is an indication that investment arbitrators may
not support an inclusive ISDS reform just yet.
However, UWGIII’s work on the ongoing ISDS reform includes a code of
conduct for arbitrators that guides against systemic bias, impartiality, and confict
of interest.292 Te code contains “strict” principles that are geared towards solving
the legitimacy crisis in the ISDS regime.293 Since arbitrators’ perceived bias
may have contributed to the ISDS legitimacy crisis,294 it is expected that the
proposed ethical rules will guide arbitrators’ approach towards local community

287. See e.g. Catherine A Rogers, “Te Politics of International Investment Arbitrators” (2013) 12
Santa Clara J Intl L 223.
288. See Gus Van Harten, “Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication: An Empirical
Study of Investment Treaty Arbitration” (2012) 50 Osgoode Hall LJ 211 at 215. Van Harten
notes that “there is not, and probably never will be, conclusive empirical evidence of the
presence or absence of systemic bias in investment arbitration.” See also Peter Nunnenkamp,
“Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Are Arbitrators Biased in Favor of Claimants?” (February
2017), Kiel Policy Brief 105 online: Kiel Institute for the World Economy <https://d-nb.
info/112978939X/34> [https://perma.cc/YLH3-BJZ8].
289. See Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, supra note 27 at 42; Anthea Roberts, “Power and
Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: Te Dual Role of States” (2010) 104 Am J
Intl L 179 at 207, n 134.
290. See generally Pia Eberhardt & Cecilia Olivet, Profting from Injustice; How Law frms,
Arbitrators and Financiers are Fueling an Investment Arbitration Boom, Helen Burley, ed,
(Corporate Europe Observatory and the Transnational Institute, 2012).
291. Ibid at 8.
292. See UNCITRAL Working Group III, Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement
(ISDS) — Draft Code of Conduct: Note by the Secretariat (9 November 2020) UN Doc A/
CN.9/WG.III/WP.201, online: <https://undocs.org/en/A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.201>.
293. See Katia Fach Gómez, Key Duties of International Investment Arbitrators: A Transnational
Study of Legal and Ethical Dilemmas (Springer, 2019) at 18.
294. See Silvia Steininger, “What’s Human Rights Got to Do With It, An Empirical Analysis of
Human Rights References in Investment Arbitration” (2018) 31 LJIL 33 at 51.
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participation and issues of human rights and the environment.295 Also, the
appointment of arbitrators with knowledge of human rights and the environment
may help to overcome the systemic bias against human rights issues because these
arbitrators can balance the commercial and human rights issues arising from
ISA cases. For example, the Hague Rules provide that “[t]he presiding or sole
arbitrator shall have demonstrated expertise in international dispute resolution
and in areas to the dispute, which may include, depending on the circumstances
of the case, business and human rights law and practice, relevant national and
international law and knowledge of the relevant feld and industry.”296 Terefore,
the appointment of an arbitrator who has expertise in areas of law other than
commercial law may help to balance arbitrators’ commercial interests with
human rights and the environment.

VI. CONCLUSION
Although “debates about investment arbitration as a dispute settlement mechanism
are as heated as they are complex,”297 this article provokes yet another thought by
comparing the possibility of reforming ISDS to adopting the BHR arbitration
proposal. It discusses the nature and justifcation for ISA and distinguishes it
from international commercial arbitration. Although international commercial
arbitration recognizes reciprocal rights and obligations, ISA does not refect
these characteristics because it downplays investors’ obligations to host states and
local communities, especially concerning human rights and the environment.
Tis article links the marginal role of investors’ obligations in ISA proceedings
to limited local community representation in ISA proceedings. It notes that
notwithstanding the role of local communities in international investment
discourse, they have limited access to justice in ISA proceedings. Trough
another proposed arbitration model (BHR arbitration), this article considers the
possibility of giving local communities direct access to justice in a non-judicial
forum. It draws parallels between ISA and BHR arbitration and argues that,
although it is important in some ways to develop new specialized regimes like
BHR arbitration, the BHR arbitration proposal is an unnecessary efort to
295. See Martin Dietrich Brauch, “Toward a Code of Conduct for Investment Adjudicators:
Can Ethical Standards Salvage ISDS” (19 September 2019), online (blog): International
Institute for Sustainable Development <https://www.iisd.org/itn/en/2019/09/19/
toward-a-code-of-conduct-for-investment-adjudicators-can-ethical-standards-salvage-isdsmartin-dietrich-brauch/> [https://perma.cc/HQJ3-ZLWX].
296. Hague Rules, supra note 21, art 11(c).
297. Bonnitcha, Poulsen & Waibel, supra note 7 at 259.
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secure access to justice for local communities. Te prospect of creating parallel
arbitral systems and peculiar procedural challenges make the BHR arbitration
proposal problematic. Instead of a new “specialized” arbitration that is untested
and prone to new legitimacy attacks, I advocate for an inclusive ISDS reform
that resolves investment disputes in a single forum. Tis article acknowledges
that ISDS reform will not be a walk in the park either—it demands procedural
and politico-economic recalibration that will be dependent on stakeholders’
commitment to creating an inclusive system. It remains to be seen whether
recent global developments, which include increased investment claims against
developed countries and the rise of emerging economies, are enough to motivate
states and MNCs to reconstruct formal participatory rights in ISA and create
access to justice for all.
Overall, considering the problematic nature of the BHR arbitration proposal
and challenges to ISA reform, there is no easy solution to the problem of access
to justice for local communities. However, the choice of ISDS reform is as good
as choosing the lesser of two evils.

